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The Internet of Things (IoT) has become a reality: small connected devices
feature in everyday objects including childrens’ toys, TVs, fridges, heating
control units, etc. Supply chains feature sensors throughout, and significant
investments go into researching next-generation healthcare, where sensors
monitor wellbeing. A future in which sensors and other (small) devices
interact to create sophisticated applications seems just around the corner.
All of these applications have a fundamental need for security and privacy
and thus cryptography is deployed as part of an attempt to secure them.
This thesis explores a particular type of security threat against IoT
devices, namely side channel attacks (SCA), that has been proven only
more powerful over the years. In brief, a side channel attack targets the
implementation of security measures and recovers secret data by exploiting
execution related information. For instance, secret keys can be recovered by
statistically analysing the timing or power consumption of the execution of
cryptographic algorithms, or sometimes results of faulty executions; data
protected in encrypted packets can be revealed by the length of packets and
timing of responses.
Three vulnerabilities in IoT applications have been identified in this work
including a flawed Random Number Generator (RNG) design, an effective
application of Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and the practicability
of Traffic Analysis (TA). These vulnerabilities commonly exist in many
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The recent revolution of silicon technologies has dramatically changed the
landscape of microcontrollers. The concept of Internet of Things (IoT)
was derived in the latest procedure of integrating wireless communication,
electronic systems, and Internet technologies. In brief, IoT is a collection
of technologies that empowers daily objects, such as vehicles, furniture and
wearables(Figure 1.1a), with embedded microcontrollers. These objects are
then connected to the Internet so that they can be managed and monitored
remotely through interfaces such as cell phones or web browsers, providing
a great flexibility for future applications. Furthermore, the computational
power that comes with the embedded microcontrollers also enables the IoT
objects to automatically interact with variate environments without requiring
human intervention. It is estimated that:
“ ... the IoT market will grow from an installed base of 15.4
billion devices in 2015 to 30.7 billion devices in 2020 and 75.4
billion in 2025. ” ([1])
A concept image from the Libeilium project [3] (Figure 1.2) is a good
demonstration of the capability of IoT applications.
Security is becoming an ever greater challenge for IoT applications, as
1
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(a) Concept of IoT (Source: [2])
(b) Estimated IoT Market to 2025
(Source: [1])
Figure 1.2: Concept Image of Libelium Smart World Project (Source: [3])
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more and more information is being digitalised by these devices. It is
estimated that:
“ The total volume of data generated by IoT will reach 600
ZB per year by 2020, 275 times higher than projected traffic going
from data centers to end users/devices (2.2 ZB); 39 times higher
than total projected data center traffic (15.3 ZB). ” ([4])
Not only is the amount of data explosively increasing, the damage that
could be caused by compromised IoT devices is also escalating. For ex-
ample, private data in health care applications is highly confidential, and
unauthorised data could lead to lethal consequences in an autonomous car
application.
1.1 Research Motivation
Different IoT applications have differ desires. For example, Wireless Sensor
Network (WSN) applications have a strong demand in the energy efficiency
of the devices as well as their size. Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET), on
the other hand, has more freedom in terms of energy and size but has a higher
demand on the response time and thus computational power. Designers of
IoT application always found themself struggling in the dilemma of demands.
For example, reducing the size often results in a reduced volume of battery;
higher speed normally comes with more energy consumption as well as more
complicated circuits and thus more space. When it comes to applications
with large deployment, such as WSN, the cost also became a major concern.
This trade off has had a great impact in the security aspect of IoT applic-
ations. In pursuing the compatibility to existing Internet protocols, the IoT
community has made many efforts in porting Internet security measurements
such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)[5]/Transport Layer Security (TLS)[6]
into the IoT scenarios over the years, yet we have not seen many substantial
3
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success in this approach. Many solutions soon lose their practicability mostly
due to their unaffordable overhead to the constrained environments of IoT.
As a result, in recent years, people have started investing in new security
standards that are designed specifically IoT scenarios, such as the NIST
Light-Weight Cryptography (LWC) competition[7] kick-started in 2015. This
research is thus driven by the demand of new security solutions for IoT. We
put our focus on addressing the threats in IoT applications, especially in
terms of side channel attacks.
1.2 Research Contributions
The contribution of this thesis is our study towards various types of side
channel attacks that could breach the security of IoT application in practical
scenarios. Notably, we highlight the security issues we present in Chapter 3
and Chapter 6 as they are identified on devices that are popular among the
research community as well as the market. This thesis also features a variety
of different side channel information being exploited, from physical leakage
such as radio frequency (Chapter 3) and power consumption (Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5), to non-physical leakage such as packet metadata (Chapter 6).
1.3 Thesis Outline
A wide range of security concerns in IoT application has been involved
in this thesis. We begin the thesis by introducing the preliminaries in
Chapter 2, followed by a case study on a classic IoT device, TI CC2538,
where we found several flaws in its Random Number Generator (RNG)
design which is unsuitable for any cryptographic implementation to rely
upon. We then move on to the aspect of a major security threat against
IoT devices, i.e. power analysis, which any cryptographic implementation
should withstand for embedded systems. In Chapter 4 we provide a thorough
4
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report on applying typical Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) against a
specific type of lightweight cipher for IoT, named ARX, and showed that its
so claimed “inherent resilience against side channel attacks” is unreliable
when it is implemented naively. A novel chosen message Differential Power
Analysis (DPA) strategy is presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 proposes
a novel type of power analytical distinguisher that exploits the ordering
of leakage to recover the secret keys. Ordinal distinguishers fall into the
category of generic distinguisher which is non-profiling DPA methods that is
robust when the leakage behaviour of target device is unknown; thus effective
against the emerging IoT devices. Chapter 6 shows our study towards the
practicability of traffic analysis, a non-physical type of side channel attack,
in IoT scenarios. Unlike power analysis, traffic analysis exploits the packet
metadata that are unprotected by the cryptographic schemes and directly
reveals information inside the encrypted data; thus they must be taken into
account to IoT application developers as the security may still be breached
even if the underlining cryptography are utilised properly. We finally conclude
the thesis in Chapter 7.
1.4 Publications
Part of the work presented in this thesis has been published in the proceedings
of various conferences. Chapter 3 and Chapter 6 are based on our published
results which are:
1. Cryptographic Randomness on a CC2538: A Case Study[8]
Yan Yan, Elisabeth Oswald and Theo Tryfonas. ‘Cryptographic ran-
domness on a CC2538: A case study’. In: IEEE International Work-
shop on Information Forensics and Security, WIFS 2016, Abu Dhabi,
United Arab Emirates, December 4-7, 2016. IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–6.
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the True-RNG (TRNG) design of CC2538, as well as proposing the
attack vector against its Radio Frequency (RF) seed.
2. Exploring Potential 6LoWPAN Traffic Side Channels[9]
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Author Contribution This work was co-authored with my super-
visors Elisabeth Oswald and Theo Tryfonas. As the main author, I
was responsible for conducting all experiments presented in the paper
as well as analysing the data. I am also responsible for proposing the
novel application fingerprint attack exploiting in [9].
Contents in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 are not published as of writing this
thesis. My contribution in these works are:
1. Chapter 4: This work was co-authored with my supervisor Elisabeth
Oswald and college Srinivas Venkatesh. As the main author I was
responsible for conducting all related experiments and proposing the
chosen message DPA strategy. Our college Srinivas Venkatesh has
contributed in part of the mathematical formalisation in this work.
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2. Chapter 5 This work was done with my supervisor Elisabeth Oswald
and colleges Arnab Roy and Srinivas Venkatesh. In this work, I was
responsible of proposing our new distinguishers and their implementa-




This thesis contains various topic related to security of IoT. In order to
make this thesis reasonably self-contained, preliminary work required to
understand the overall background related to the topics is provided here.
Topic specific preliminaries are provided at the beginning of each chapter.
2.1 Basic Statistics and Information Theory
Statistical techniques and concepts from information theory are frequently
used in this thesis. This section reviews some fundamental concepts which
are covered by any statistical textbook such as [10] and [11].
2.1.1 Cumulative Distribution Function
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) is one of the most common way
when describing a distribution of a random variable. For a real value random
variable X, its CDF DX(x) is defined as:
DX(x) = Pr(X ≤ x)
8
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Hence by definition, it holds that:
Pr(a < X ≤ b) = DX(b)−DX(a)
An estimation of CDF based on sampled data is referred as an Empirical
Cumulative Distribution Function (ECDF).
2.1.2 Probability Density Function
For a continuous random variable X, the Probability Density Function (PDF)










2.1.3 Pearson Correlation Coefficient
Pearson correlation coefficient, also referred as Pearson product-moment
correlation coefficient, is a widely used measurement to evaluate the linear




where σX and σY are the variances of X and Y , and cov(X,Y ) the covariance
of X and Y . When given two sample sets X = {x1, ..., xn} and Y =
{y1, ..., yn}, Pearson correlation coefficient can be computed by:
pX,Y =
∑n




where x̄ and ȳ are the sample means of X and Y .
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Pearson’s correlation is a value in range [−1, 1] where 0 implies X and
Y are uncorrelated. A correlation of 1 indicates a perfect positive linear
relation whereas −1 indicates negative one.
2.1.4 Shannon’s Entropy
Shannon’s entropy is a common method to evaluate the uncertainty of random
variables. For a discrete random variable x sampled from a distribution X,





Entropy is non-negative and intuitively a higher H(X) implies more uncer-
tainty of X. The term entropy in this thesis always refers to Shannon’s
entropy, unless otherwise stated.
2.1.5 Mutual Information
Mutual Information is a quantity that measures the dependency between
two variables. For two variables x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , their mutual information
is defined as:
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y )
= H(Y )−H(Y |X)
= H(X,Y )−H(X)−H(Y )
Intuitively, a higher mutual information implies more dependency between
the variables.
2.1.6 Kolmogorov–Smirnov Test
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test (KS test) is a non-parametric statistical that
compares a sample with a reference distribution (one-sample KS test), or
compare two samples (two-sample KS test). Most application of KS test in
10
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this thesis are two-tailed two-sample KS test, i.e., we are mostly interested
in testing whether two samples are sampled from the same distribution. The




where F1,n(x) and F2,m are the ECDFs of the samples being tested and
sup the supremum function. Intuitively, higher Dn,m implies less likely the
samples are equal and vice versa.
2.1.7 Signal-to-Noise Ratio
Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) is the measurement to evaluate a desired signal




where σ2signal and σ
2
noise are the variances of desired signal and noise respect-
ively.
Specifically, the following estimation proposed in [12] is also widely used




where T is the set of leakage values on power traces and X the set of target
intermediates.
2.2 Contiki OS
Contiki OS[13] is an open source Operating System (OS) dedicated to IoT
devices that is highly optimised towards energy efficiency. The OS also
features fully support for IP-based networks (IPv4 and IPv6). It has been
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widely used among the WSN academic research community. There are several
similar open source embedded OS such as Tiny OS, OpenWSN and RTOS,
etc.
Contiki OS has a wide support for various market available System on
Chip (SoC)s for IoT. In my work, Contiki OS is mainly used in conjunction
with two specific devices which are CC2538[14] and TelosB[15].
2.3 CC2538 and TelosB
CC2538[14] is a SoC for IoT launched by Texas Instruments (TI) in 2013. It
features high end computational performance powered by an ARM Cortex-M3
Micro-Controller Unit (MCU), low power consumption and IEEE 802.15.4[16]
compliant RF transceiver. In addition, CC2538 has hardware support for
cryptographic operations including AES[17], SHA2[18], RSA[19] and Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC)[20] accelerators, which suggests its use in secure
IoT applications. As a result, the chip features in the suggested list for
Zigbee[21] and 6LoWPAN[22] solutions on TI’s website[23], and projects
such as Contiki[13] and OpenWSN[24] began to support the CC2538 with
enthusiasm.
On the other hand, TelosB[15] (also known as Sky mote) is a low cost
open source SoC published by UC Berkeley with 802.15.4 support. Compared
to CC2538, TelosB is more of a low end device with a less powerful MSP430
MCU and less RAM. The IoT related experiments in this thesis are focused
on these devices as they represent a wide range of similar platforms. A full
list of supported platforms of Contiki OS can be found in [13].
2.4 SCALE Board
The SCALE board [25] (Figure 2.2) is an open source test board dedicated
to side channel and fault attack analysis. The board contains an on board
12
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(a) CC2538 Evaluation Module (b) TelosB
Figure 2.1: Devices used with Contiki-OS
Figure 2.2: A NXP LPC1114fn28 (ARM Cortex M0 architecture) housed on
a SCALE board (Photo taken by Joey Green)
oscillator (clocked at a rate of 16MHz), and supplies the chip with power
either via a dedicated power supply or via USB. To aid power analysis the
board directly taps into the core’s supply voltage and amplifies it, thereby
facilitating a convenient measurement point suitable for a standard probe.
All real power traces used in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 are collected on a




2.5 Side Channel Attacks
Securely implementing cryptographic primitives is a difficult task and vulner-
abilities are constantly found on even the latest digital products. Not only
because the algorithms are being badly implemented [26][27][28], confiden-
tiality of cryptographic secrets could also be easily compromised when an
adversary is given additional execution information such as the execution
time [29] and traces of power consumption [30]. In a cryptography context,
these attacks are referred to as Side Channel Attacks (SCA) and they have
been proven to be a great threat to embedded systems, which are the major
components in any IoT applications. The information being exploited by
these attacks is usually referred to as side channel leakage (or simply leakage)
in side channel literatures.
The concept of side channel attacks can be further extended to wider
scenarios where the adversary aims not only to recover the cryptographic keys
but also to directly extract information regardless of data being encrypted,
such as the attacks described in [31] and [32]. The work presented in this
thesis mainly involves two specific types of side channel attacks, DPA and
Traffic Analysis (TA), which we provider more details later in Section 2.6
and Section 2.7.
2.6 Power Analysis Attacks
Power analysis attacks are based on the fact that processor consumes different
amount of energy depending on the data being processed. The landmark work
done by Kocher et al. published in 1999 has for the first time demonstrated
the potential of recovering the secret key through analysing the traces of
power consumptions during the execution of a cryptographic algorithm (see
Figure 2.3 for an example).
Power analysis attacks often require the adversary to have physical access
14
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Figure 2.3: An example: power trace of a round of SPARX cipher on SCALE
board
to the device and it is generally assumed that the adversary collects the power
traces together with known plaintext and/or ciphertext. Power analysis is
particularly critical to the security of embedded devices, such as smart cards
, microcontrollers or Radio-Frequency IDentification (RFID) widely used
in IoT applications, as in many cases they are deployed into environments
which lack physical protection.
A significant amount of work has followed the idea of [33] over the years
and power analysis has become one of the most explored subjects among
different side channel attacks. Power analysis is generally categorised into
two classes:
Simple Power Analysis (SPA) SPA tries to derive the key directly from
only few or even just one trace. SPA is normally challenging in practice
as the adversary needs to know all the details of the cryptographic




Differential Power Analysis (DPA) In contrast to SPA where the ad-
versary aims to derive the key using only a few traces, DPA utilises
many traces and performs statistical tests to recover the key. DPA is
generally considered more robust than SPA as it requires less detailed
knowledge of the implementation and can cope with extremely noisy
traces [30].
The work presented in this thesis is mostly concerned about the impact
of DPA attacks against IoT devices. We address more details in this section.
2.6.1 Univariate vs Multivariate
In a DPA attack, a power trace L recorded by the adversary contains many
leakage points of real values:
L = (L(v1), L(v2), . . . , L(vi), . . . )
whereby each point corresponds to an intermediate value (or simply briefed
as intermediate) vi as it is defined by the implementation of a cipher. L is
the leakage function, and a generally accepted form of defining L is a linear
combination of a deterministic and a non-deterministic component:
L(v) = MD(v) + ε
where MD is a device leakage model (or just leakage model) which is char-
acterises the target device, and ε is an independent random noise sampled
from some Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2). In practice, MD could be a very
complex function and no a priori knowledge is available to the adversary.
It is generally assumed that the power traces are aligned, i.e., the same
index in the traces implies the same operation in the cryptographic algorithm.
A standard DPA style attack is based on this assumption and is typically
univariate, i.e. a single leakage point from each leakage trace together with a
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subkey dependent hypothesis on an intermediate value (the so-called target
function) form the input to a mathematical function, which is called the
side channel distinguisher (or simply distinguisher) [34]1. This single point
is typically unknown, and thus the distinguisher is independently applied
to all points in a leakage trace. A successful attack will both recover a
portion of an unknown key as well as the trace point(s) at which the targeted
key-dependent value has been computed. Some typical distinguishers are
explained later in this section.
Clearly an adversary could utilise the leakage of all leakage points simul-
taneously as in [35], but such attacks, called multivariate attacks, require
knowledge of the precise locations of all targeted intermediates and their
respective leakage models [36]. Consequently, these attacks place considerable
demands on what real-life leakage adversaries can obtain and thus are seen
as complementary to standard DPA style attacks.
In this thesis, a univariate attack is always assumed, unless stated other-
wise. A power trace is hence denoted as a pair (x, t) where x is the known
input/output and t the leakage value of intended target intermediate v. We
denote:
t = L(v) = L(Fk∗(x))
where Fk∗ is the target function F embedded with the secret key k
∗.
2.6.2 Side Channel Distinguishers
Side channel distinguishers (or simply distinguishers) are mathematical
functions (usually based on statistical tests) in DPA attacks that takes a
key hypothesis, a.k.a. key guess, and leakages value as inputs, and outputs
a distinguishing score corresponding to the hypothesised key; thus giving
a ranking on the key hypothesis. Without loss of generality, in this thesis,
distinguishing scores are always defined such that a higher distinguishing
1It is accepted to use the term DPA attack irrespective of the distinguisher.
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score is always considered more likely the hypothesised key equals to the
targeted secret key and vice versa.
There are many distinguishers defined in DPA literatures. Here we
introduce the classification proposed by [37] with instances including the
most well known distinguishers described in [30].
Partition-based Distinguisher
A partition-based distinguisher defines a partition Pk of the leakage values
according to hypothesised intermediates computed from the hypothesised
key k and the known input x of the traces. Then, the partitions for each key
hypothesis are checked with statistical tests. The key associated with the
the most meaningful partition with respect to the real physical leakage is
finally returned as the best key guess.
Example 1. (Single-bit DPA) One of the most well known distinguishers
of this type is the Single-bit-Difference-of-Means DPA attack [30], referred
as Single-bit DPA in this thesis. For this distinguisher, the adversary selects
a bit of the target intermediate and partitions the leakage values based on
the value of the target bit. For example, denote by B(v) the bit selection
function that returns a specific bit of b, the adversary defines the partitions
for a key hypothesis k as:
P0 = {t : B(Fk(x)) = 0}
P1 = {t : B(Fk(x)) = 1}
And the distinguishing score for key guess k is defined as:
Dk = |P̄0 − P̄1|
where P̄0 and P̄1 are the sample means of P0 and P1.
The intuition of this distinguisher is simple: it exploits the difference in
18
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the leakage of the selected bit and the fact that the correct partition will
maximise such difference.
Another type of well known distinguisher in this class is generic distin-
guisher, which we explain in details in the related Chapter 5.
Comparing-based Distinguisher
For comparing-based distinguishers, the adversary selects a prediction model
M and predicts the leakage based on the intermediates computed with the
key guess. Then, the predicted leakage for each key guess is compared to the
leakage values of collected traces using statistical tests. The best key guess
is finally returned as the key guess that is most similar leakage prediction to
the actual leakage.
The selection of the prediction model M strongly relies on the adversary’s
knowledge to the target device. However, for an attack, only relative dif-
ference between predicted leakages are important [30]. Without a priori
knowledge of the target device, the most commonly used power models are
the Hamming Weight (HW) and Hamming Distance (HD) models, and their
implications of leakage are justified in [30]. Note that in order to use the
HD model, the adversary is additionally required to predict the preceding
or succeeding intermediate; therefore the HW model is preferable in many
cases.
Example 2. (Pearson’s Correlation) The most commonly seen distin-
guisher is (the absolute value of) Pearson’s correlation using HW prediction.
Given a set of traces {(xi, ti)}, for a key guess k, the adversary predicts:
t′i = HW (Fk(xi))
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And the distinguishing score for k is defined as:
Dk = |pT,T ′ | = |
∑n







where T = {ti} and T ′ = {t′i}, and t̄ and t̄′ are the means of T and T ′.
Due to the popularity of Pearson’s correlation, it is sometimes ambigu-
ously referred as CPA in some literatures.
Note that these classifications are not exclusive. For example, Pearson’s
correlation can be utilised in a “generic emulating” manner as a single-bit
distinguisher (i.e. only one bit of v is taken as model M). However, the fact
that it then only operates in a single bit manner implies a loss in efficiency.
On the other hand, single-bit DPA can also partition the traces based on a
sophisticated leakage prediction model rather than simply selecting a bit in
the target intermediate.
The performance, or efficiency, of distinguishers are generally evaluated by
the number of traces required to recover the secret key. Note that single-bit
DPA and Pearson’s correlation normally only assumes the adversary being
able to passively observe the traces. In case of a more powerful adversary
that has full control over a device identical to the target, template attacks
[38][39] are another option that efficiently recover the secret key in general.
Template Attack The most distinctive character of template attack is
the profiling stage that builds a template of target device before the attack.
The template is constructed through traces collected on a device identical to
the target with known secrets and thus known intermediates. During the
attack, the adversary matches traces collected on the target devices to the
template built beforehand and derives the key.
There are various methods for profiling as well as matching the template,
e.g. one may use the intermediate values for profiling and then matches
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the template using least-square strategy [30]. It is worth mentioning that
due to the natural similarities, there is an emerging trend of utilising ma-
chine learning technologies in DPA attacks [40] [41]. However, no significant
improvement was reported utilising machine learning techniques to my know-
ledge.
Since the capability of profiling is such a strong assumption to the
adversary’s power, template attacks (and their variations) are also referred
to as profiling attacks, in contrast to the non-profiling attacks such as single-
bit DPA (Example 1) and Pearson’s correlation (Example 2). In practice,
profiling attacks also suffers from the misalignment of acquisition setups
between the profiling phase and attack phase. Therefore, this thesis mainly
focuses on non-profiling attacks.
2.7 Traffic Analysis
Traffic analysis is well studied in the context of encrypted Internet traffic,
especially for web applications based on HTTPs and TCP/IP. In general,
rather than attacking the cryptographic primitives employed by the security
protocols, traffic analysis exploits side channel information that are not
protected by the encryption, such as packet length, responding time, unen-
crypted packet headers, etc. These attacks typically require the adversary to
have some priori knowledge of the application being attacked, for instance,
the set of potential web sites the victim may visit, or the available options
on a specific web site[32]. The adversary recovers information related to the
encrypted data through correlating the unprotected side channel information
to the known options those may be adopted by the victim.
The landmark study by Chen et al. [32] discussed different side channel
attacks against web applications and [42] studied the practicability of an
attack specifically targeted Google and Bing search boxes. Later work by
Mather and Oswald [43] proposed the use of Mutual Information to pinpoint
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the potential leakage points in web traffic. For non-HTTPs applications, the
papers [44], [45] and [46] described attacks against encrypted text, voice and
video traffic respectively.
Machine learning is widely used to analyse the traffic, and behaviours of
different classifiers are studied by [47] and [48]. Based on all these published
works we can conclude that two features, the packet length and response
time, are the most exploited among all attacks. Different countermeasures
are proposed accordingly, such as Traffic Morphing [49], HTTPOS [50] and
Format-transformation Encryption [51].
2.8 Lightweight Cryptography
Lightweight cryptography refers to cryptographic schemes that are suitable
for extremely resource constrained environment and its development is mostly
driven by different demands of IoT application. As of the variety of IoT
applications, the so called “lightweight” is defined differently according to
different context. Without loss of generality, lightweight ciphers are normally
optimised towards the following aspects:
• Throughput evaluates the amount of plaintext that can be processed
per time unit.
• Latency which evaluates how quick the invoker of the cryptographic
algorithm can get an output.
• Energy consumption evaluates the amount of energy consumed by
the cipher.
Additional properties are evaluated specifically for hardware or software
oriented designs. For hardware, Gate Equivalent (GE) reflects the size of
area needed to implement the cipher. For software, memory consumption
and code size are evaluated.
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There is hardly a uniformly best cipher in IoT, as different properties are
desired in different use cases. For instance, energy efficiency is essential in
WSN applications so ciphers consuming the least energy is desired. VANET
have strict requirements to the response time of the devices and thus latency
is prioritised. In case of RFID, small sized hardware implementation is
preferred to bring down the cost, as well as the capability to operate with
minimum energy when the device is only powered passively.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) lightweight
cryptography project started in 2015 [7] and eventually became one of the
most remarkable event in the development of lightweight cryptography by
driving a significant attention into this field. For asymmetric cryptography,
lattice-based schemes are one of most popular paradigms in recent years. [52]
proposed an efficient encryption scheme that is even capable to run on an
8-bit AVR processor, and the one proposed by [53] highly optimises the circuit
size for a hardware implementation. Other cryptographic primitives are also
proposed in related literatures such as the signature scheme of [54]. [55]
provides a nice survey to the practicability of lattice-based cryptography in
IoT scenarios and [56] provides a dedicated report on the energy consumption
of different lattice-based schemes.
Despite the boost of performance in recent years, many asymmetric
schemes are still far from practical in the extremely resource constrained
scenarios, such as wireless sensors and RFID. For example, the minimum
signature size achieved in [54] is 5600 bits, i.e., 700 bytes, whereas the
Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU)2 specified for 6LoWPAN network is 129
bytes [22], where the payload consumed by headers required to transmit the
key are not even counted. Such discrepancy between proposed schemes and
existing standards remains an open issue to date for asymmetric cryptography;
therefore in this thesis we focus on the relatively concrete side of symmetric
2The maximum amount of data that can be transmitted in one transmission.
23
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES
cryptography. A thorough survey for this topic is done by [57].
The question people may ask when arguing the need of lightweight sym-
metric cipher is why AES[17] is not enough? It is indeed that AES excels
in many aspects and it could be used whenever applicable, for instance, it
is adopted by the 802.15.4 standard[16] as the only cryptographic primitive
for link layer encryption as well as being shipped as the built-in crypto-
graphic coprocessor for TI CC2538 and several other products in that series.
However, as argued in [57], for extremely resource constrained applications,
improvements should be made whenever possible. [57] has listed several
drawbacks of AES that makes people rethink whether we should relying
on it, where the major problems are related to its 8-bit S-Box structure.
For software implementations, either storing the 8-bit S-Box or code that
generates it on the fly is memory consuming and consequently energy con-
suming. Also due to its large block size and look-up based S-Box designs,
hardware implementations can hardly achieve a GE less than such as 2000
with reasonable countermeasures, or efficiently masked in software in terms of
code size and/or memory. All these issues therefore left space to be improved
by lightweight ciphers.
As of many existing ciphers, lightweight symmetric ciphers also consist of
linear components and non-linear components, where the latter are generally
the more interesting target for side channel analysis as pointed out by [58].
The most popular design paradigms are listed in [57], such as the S-Box-based
constructions including look-up table and bit-slice. This thesis focuses on the
other non-S-Box option, ARX, where more details are given in Section 2.8.1.
A study towards the side channel aspects of the S-Box-based constructions




ARX cipher refers to the family of ciphers that base their round function
on the simple combination of modular addition, rotation, and Exclusive-
or (XOR). The idea of combining addition modulo 2n, XOR, and rotation
as a round function, has been suggested as early as 1987 in the block cipher
FEAL[60]. The appeal of this construction is primarily in the fact that when
choosing n equal to the word size of a processor, software implementations
gain considerable speed-ups.
Round functions in ARX ciphers have efficient and simple expressions
via functions that are typically available as instructions on small embedded
devices. This enables excellent performance both with respect to execution
time and energy consumption, which makes ARX ciphers very appealing to
the IoT scenario. Specifically, for software implementations on microcon-
trollers, modular addition is supported by most, if not all, processors and
can be performed very efficiently without utilising additional registers [57].
Some recent examples of ARX ciphers include Chacha20 [61] and Salsa20
[62] family stream ciphers, SHA-3 finalists BLAKE [63] and SKEIN [64], as
well as other block ciphers such as SPECK [65] and SPARX [66], etc. Here
we specifically address SPARX as it is the first instance of this type of cipher
that has a proved bound against differential and linear cryptanalysis [66],
whereas justifying the security of ARX ciphers is generally more difficult due
to its lack of S-Box and only uses modular addition for non-linear layer [57].
Side Channel Attacks on ARX
The absence of look-up tables has left ARX with an impression of having
certain inherent resilience against side channel attacks. For example, the
authors of SPARX [66] stated:
“ ... The choice of using the ARX paradigm was based on
three observations. First, getting rid of the table look-ups, asso-
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ciated with S-Box based designs, increases the resilience against
side-channel attacks. Second, this design strategy minimizes the
total number of operations performed during an encryption, al-
lowing particularly fast software implementations. Finally, the
computer code describing such algorithms is very small, making
this approach especially appealing for lightweight block ciphers
where the memory requirements are the harshest. ” (Section 1,
[66])
An earlier [67] research also stated:
“ Some algorithms or SHA-3 candidates (i.e. BLAKE or
CubeHash) do not use such substitution table, while they rely
exclusively on modular addition , rotation << and XOR ⊕ op-
erations (so-called ARX constructions). In this case, side-channel
analysis is still possible but the XOR or modular addition selection
functions are less efficient than for the Sbox case. Moreover, it
has been theoretically proven that the XOR selection function is
less efficient that the modular addition operations. Indeed, the
propagation of the carry in the modular addition leads to some
non-linearity whereas the XOR operation if completely linear. ”
(Section 2.2, [67])
Furthermore, because the non-linear component is given by the addition
modulo 2n, it does not need to be encoded as a table lookup and it is arguable
that the ARX instructions take almost constant time on most platforms.
When considering cache timing attacks, the absence of tables is a distinctive
advantage, as stated in [68] and [69]. Remarkably, [70] has quantified the
difficulty of attacking different instructions utilised in an ARX ciphers in
terms of Pearson’s correlation (see Example 2) and concluded that even the
most effective target, which is the only non-linear operation, i.e., modular
addition, does not seem effective enough to mount a practical attack.
26
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES
As of writing the thesis, there have been minimal successful side channel
attacks on ARX ciphers. The most significant result to our knowledge is q[71]
which demonstrated that it is possible to improve on straightforward DPA
style attacks when targeting the modular addition in SKEIN [64]. In [71],
the authors observed that the symmetrical structure of modular addition
eventually results into a pair of correlation peaks; therefore the performance
of an attack can be improved by testing pairs of correlations rather than a
single correlation. However, attacks like [71] still face the practical problem
that the number of key hypotheses that are tested via the target function
increases exponentially with the operand size (the detailed reasoning is given
in Chapter 4). For example, in the case of a 32-bit modern processor such
as an ARM-M0, performing a DPA style attack requires the adversary to
enumerate both 32-bits adders which has a space complexity of 264. To solve
this issue, [71] assumes a stronger adversary that is capable of choosing the
plaintext to be encrypted, comparing to the classic settings in Example 1
and Example 2 where the DPA adversary only passively collect traces.
These results were partly the motivation of the work in Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5 in this thesis, where a thorough analysis is given on this topic.
Side Channel Countermeasures of ARX
Countermeasures such as masking (secret sharing) are well understood and
costly [72]. Specifically, protecting ARX ciphers has been considered even
more costly by many literatures, for example:
“ When variables are added or subtracted, they must be
available in arithmetic masking form and so will be the result;
when they are XORed, rotated or shifted, they must be available
in Boolean masking form and so will be the result. The problem is
now when variables undergo operations of different types; namely
when we have a variable in Boolean masking form and it must be
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added to another variable, or vice versa, when we have a variable
in arithmetic masking form and it must be rotated or XORed to
another variable. The only solution to that problem identified
up to now is converting a variable in Boolean masking form to
arithmetic masking form or vice versa when needed. The number
of such conversions required depends on the way the different
operations are alternated in the algorithm. This can be quite often
as most ARX algorithms get their non-linearity exactly from this
alternation. ” (Section 3, [73])
and
“ If the algorithm uses an ARX structure, then it is possible
to use the arithmetic structure of modular addition to mask this
operation directly. Rather than masking each carry propagation
bit separately, we can instead generate secret shares and combine
them using modular addition directly. The problem is then in
the interaction between the masking of the modular addition and
the masking of the linear part because they are done in different
groups. ” (Section 5.1.4, [57])
It is indeed true that for ARX constructions, one has to cope with the
fact that there are Boolean operations (requiring Boolean masking or secret
sharing) and arithmetic operations (requiring arithmetic masking or secret
sharing). Several efforts have been made attempting to mitigate this issue
including [74] and [75]. The latest result of this topic comes from [76] where
the authors combined several optimisations based on the results of [75] and
[77]. [76] achieved a 36% speed improvement on ChaCha20 comparing to [77]
by reducing some of the redundant instructions as well as the randomness
required in [77]. The authors eventually reported an overhead of 4.5 fold to










RNGs are one of the most critical component for all cryptographic schemes.
A typical usage of RNG is the secret key generation which is at the heart of
any security. RNGs are also widely needed in other scenarios. For example,
in generating the nonces for ElGamal[78] and Schnorr[79] signatures, or
sampling the errors for Learning With Error (LWE)[80] based schemes([81],
[82], [83], etc). As such, designs of RNG must be addressed with care, as its
failure would immediately compromise any cryptographic scheme relying on
the randomness it generates.
On the other hand, our study finds that some classic IoT devices advert-
ising for security usage failed to deliver a qualified RNG. In this chapter, we
present a case study on TI’s SoC CC2538[14], a popular device featuring
cryptographic support that has been widely used in WSN applications. We
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show its vulnerabilities in various aspects that could have devastating con-
sequences. The combination of Contiki OS on CC2538 is a frequently seen
platform in many IoT applications among academic and industry.
Note that similar vulnerabilities have been previously reported by [84]
in 2010 on some predecessors in the series of CC2538. Essentially, [84]
explained that how the vulnerable PRNG can be exploited to break the
ECDSA signature in a smart meter application, as well as proposed the
potential of biasing the radio based TRNG. However, [84] did not provide
an implementation of the radio biasing attack of which blank we have filled
in this work.
This work was done in conjunction with E. Oswald and T. Tryfonas. It
has been published in:
Yan Yan, Elisabeth Oswald and Theo Tryfonas. ‘Cryptographic random-
ness on a CC2538: A case study’. In: IEEE International Workshop on
Information Forensics and Security, WIFS 2016, Abu Dhabi, United Arab
Emirates, December 4-7, 2016. IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–6. isbn: 978-1-5090-1138-4.
doi: 10.1109/WIFS.2016.7823912. url: https://doi.org/10.1109/
WIFS.2016.7823912[8]
As the main author I was responsible for all main aspects of the work.
This includes investigating the software aspect of Contiki[13] drivers for
CC2538, reverse engineering the RNG-related circuits on the device, and
proposing as well as implementing the non-invasive attack that biases the
RNG.
3.2 Preliminaries
3.2.1 Random Number Generators
RNGs are widely used in cryptography. The quality of the random numbers
generated are often critical to the security of cryptographic schemes. For
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example, a key generated by a badly designed RNG would greatly endanger
the encryption scheme relying on its secrecy.
In practice, RNGs are usually implemented as a PRNG seeded by a
TRNG, which we briefly introduce in this section.
TRNG
According to [85], TRNGs are procedures of producing totally unpredictable
bits by extracting randomness from physical processes that behave in a
fundamentally nondeterministic way. Due to their physical nature, sometimes
they are also refereed as physical or hardware RNGs.
TRNGs can be implemented in various ways utilising different physical
features, which are referred to as sources of randomness or entropy in some
literatures. Some instances of TRNG implementation include:
• Noisy electrical circuits[86][87][88]. This approach has been commonly
seen on security critical smart card applications.
• Noises sampled from various drivers. This approach has been adopted
by the Linux kernel[89] for desktops.
• Radio noises sampled in the air[90][91]. This approach is commonly
seen in radio equipped devices such as wireless sensors.
PRNG
Although random numbers can be obtained by a TRNG on its own, their
efficiency and randomness are often bounded by the properties of their
physical entropy source. Therefore, in practice, TRNGs are mostly used only
to generate seeds that are used to initialise the PRNGs, which then generate
the randomness as requested by applications.
Cryptographically, [92] has provided the following formal definition of a
PRF:
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Definition 1. Let l be a polynomial and let G be a deterministic polynomial-
time algorithm such that for n and any input s ∈ {0, 1}n, the result G(s) is
a string of length l(n). We say that G is a pseudorandom generator if the
following conditions hold:
1. (Expansion:) For every n it holds that l(n) > n.
2. (Pseudo-randomness:) For any Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT)
algorithm D, there is a negligible function negl such that
|Pr[D(G(s)) = 1]− Pr[D(r) = 1]| ≤ negl(n)
, where the first probability is taken over uniform choice of of s ∈ {0, 1}n
and the randomness of D, and the second probability is taken over
uniform choice of r ∈ {0, 1}l(n) and the randomness of D.
We call l the expansion factor of G.
The research of constructing cryptographically secure PRNGs remains
active nowadays and new constructions are constantly being proposed, such
as [93] [94] and [95]. Notably, constructions based on keyed Hash Message
Authentication Code (HMAC) or block ciphers (typically AES[17]) as re-
commended by the NIST document [96] are among the most widely adopted
approaches.
3.2.2 Randomness Validation
There are many methods proposed to validating the randomness of PRNGs.
The NIST random bit test suite[97] implements a collection of statistical
randomness test and is widely used by researchers. A full list of the tests
performed by the NIST test suite can be found in [97].
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3.3 Related Work
Two siblings of CC2538, CC2430[98] and CC2530[99], have been previ-
ously reported of using a 16 bit Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) as
PRNG in [84] and [100]. These chips are the predecessors of CC2538 in
the SimpleLinkTMseries and the same RNG designs, including both TRNG
and PRNG, were shared among them. The blogs reported the problems
also warned that it could easily be exploited to compromise the Z-Stack lib-
rary[101] and Smart Energy Profile ECC in many Smart Meter applications.
Although the potential of biasing the TRNG by injecting a jamming signal
was also contemplated, the blogs did not provide any design of the jamming
signal as well as an implementation. To this end, we examine the technical
feasibility and demonstrate a working attack in this chapter.
Although CC2538 has hardware support for various cryptographic opera-
tions (see Section 2.3), there is no dedicated RNG provided for cryptographic
applications. Instead, the user guide[102] suggests the use of an onboard 16
bit LFSR as a PRNG which is seeded by the RF module through sampling
radio noise. Whilst the user guide at no point suggested that this method
should be used in conjunction with cryptographic algorithms, developers
have little choice in the absence of alternatives.
3.4 RF Noise as TRNG
In this section, we present the work of reverse engineering the TRNG design
of CC2538. Unlike many higher end devices, such as security ICs, CC2538
does not come with a dedicated TRNG. The only option provided in the
user guide is to use the RF module to sample radio noise as random bits:
“ For the CC2538, when a random value is required, writing
the SOC ADC RNDL register with random bits from the IF ADC
in the RF receive path seeds the LFSR. ... (Section 23.12) Single
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random bits from either the I or Q channel can be read from the
RFRND register. ” (Section 16.2.2, [102])
The user guide[102] also reports on the good quality of the randomness:
“ Randomness tests show good results for this module. How-
ever, a slight DC component exists. In a simple test where the
RFRND.IRND register was read a number of times and the data
was grouped into bytes, about 20 million bytes were read. When
interpreted as unsigned integers between 0 and 255, the mean
value was 127.6518, which indicates that there is a DC component.
... For the first 20 million individual bits, the probability of a 1 is
P (1) = 0.500602 and P (0) = 1− P (1) = 0.499398. ” (Section
23.12, [102])
and their test results are shown in Figure 3.1.
To verify the claims in the manual, we applied the NIST Statistical Test
Suite[97] on 132636001 bits sampled by this seeding method in a common
office environment with multiple wireless devices (smart phones and laptops,
etc) activated. Since the Contiki driver only uses the bits generated in I
channel and one bit is returned upon each read to the RNG register; therefore
we concatenated all bits into one bit stream. The bits passed all tests in
the NIST test suite, with P (0) = 0.49995001 and P (1) = 0.50004999, which
shows that the RF noise (when not tampered with) is indeed a good source
for random numbers. However, it remains unclear whether such source can
practically be influenced by crafted RF signals.
3.4.1 Reverse Engineering the TRNG Design
The documents supplied by TI do not explain further details of how IF ADC
in the receive I/Q channels are translated to random bits. We have neither
1There is no standardised guile line for number of bits to be tested. However, we
consider this value as a sufficiently large sample size.
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Figure 3.1: RF core seeding result (Source: [102])
been able to find any public document describing the RF design of CC2538.
However, we noticed that the same design has been applied to several products
in TI’s SimpleLinkTMseries, some of which provided a better explanation of
their RF core and RNG designs.
In the CC2430 user manual[98], we found a description of its RF core as
in Figure 3.2 which explains that the input analogue signal to IF ADC goes
through the following components:
• Low Noise Amplifier (LNA) which amplifies the signal.
• Mixer which down converts the signal frequency. The Frequency Syn-
thesiser is used as the local oscillator.
• Band pass filter which removes the out of band signals.
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Figure 3.2: CC2430 RF Design (Source: [98]
• The Automatic Gain Control (AGC) circuit further adjusts the signal
strength to the input level of ADC.
The CC2520 Data Sheet[103] explains the random bit is actually the LSB
from ADC output:
“ Single random bits from either the I or Q channel (con-
figurable) can be output on GPIO pins at a rate of 8MHz. One
can also select to xor the I and Q bits before they are output
on a GPIO pin. These bits are taken from the least significant
bit in the I and/or Q channel after the decimation filter in the
demodulator. ” (Section 24, [103])
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Figure 3.3: CC2520 RNG design (Source: [103])
A block diagram is also provided, as shown in Figure 3.3.
Interestingly, we noticed that CC2538, CC2520, CC253X and CC2540/41
reported exactly the identical randomness test result in their user manuals
([102] [103] [99]). We suspect the above evidence showed that CC2538 is very
likely to have adopted the exactly same designs.
The information provided in all these documents explained the random-
ness of the seeding method. Denote the analogue RF signal by Vs and noise
by N , the analogue input to the ADC, denote by Vin, can be represented as:
Vin = Vs +N (3.1)
The noise N can be induced by multiple sources in practice, including
noise produced by the signal source, environmental noise, and noise induced
by the components in the device itself, etc.
The random bit b can therefore be represented as:
b = LSB(Vin) = LSB(Vs +N) (3.2)
where LSB() ∈ {0, 1} represents the operation of taking the LSB of A/D
conversion output.
From Equation (3.2) we observe that any difference in Vin that is larger
than the scale of ADC, i.e. the voltage represented by the LSB of ADC, could
flip b. According to the CC2538 Datasheet[104], the receiver can be sensitive
to signals down to −97dBm (typical value with TA = 25◦C, VDD = 3V and
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fC = 2440MHz). On the other hand, the typical environmental noise in our
test environment is about −92dBm which is significantly higher than the
receiver sensitivity. We consider this reading as a generic office use case and
the result of randomness test as evidence to the sampling method.
3.4.2 Biasing the RF Signal in Practice
Equation (3.2) indicates that the random bit b is jointly determined by
the signal Vs and noise N . Although an adversary can generate arbitrary
signals, i.e. Vs is fully controlled by the adversary, it is clear that controlling
N is difficult in practice. For instance, noises accumulated by different
amplification stages are physically inevitable and intrinsic to the physical
device. Hence it is not straightforward to fully control Vin = Vs + N in
practice.
An alternative attempt is to provide the RF with an ‘illegal’ input Vin.
We considered two methods in our experiments: saturation and decimation.
Saturation attempts to provide the RF with a strong signal that is above its
acceptance level, whereas decimation attempts to suppress any RF signal to
beneath the receiver sensitivity.
Ideally we expect these illegal inputs will trigger the ADC into a fault
state which could potentially result into a predictable ADC output and
thus biased b. But in practice, decimation does not seem practical for the
same reason that noise induced by the circuit itself is physically inevitable.
This made saturation the only viable option for us. We further note that
the undisclosed circuit design of the device also posed a difficulty in our
experiments. Without knowledge of the exact circuit design, we had to
perform black box experiments.
The device we used is an OpenMote[105] powered by CC2538. The
receiver has been configured to the default 2475MHz (channel 25 in 802.15.4)
for Contiki CC2538 driver. We extended the length of each seed from RF to
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Figure 3.4: Example of receiver AGC (Source: [107])
128 bits in our experiments in coping to a potential PRNG design based on
AES-128 as explained in Section 3.2, although we still consider the bits are
generated bitwise when applying the NIST test suite.
Constant Strength Sine Signal
The first signal we attempted was a constant strength sine wave signal on
the working frequency. According to CC2538 data sheet[104], the saturation
signal strength for the RF receiver is 10dBm. We have attempted to increase
the input signal strength up to 13dBm, which is roughly double of the
saturation voltage, but no bias was observed. The seed sampled under this
signal has passed all tests in the NIST test suite.
The result implies that the AGC circuit could have tuned down the signal
which might have consequently prevented the seed from being biased. Al-
though the exact AGC design for CC2538 is unclear, Figure 3.4 demonstrates
an example of AGC design using 4 Voltage Controlled Amplifiers (VGAs).
The output signal is parallelly connected to a detector to estimate the signal
strength. The output of detector is compared to a reference voltage and their
difference is provided as a feedback to adjust the control voltage of VGAs.
To prevent signal distortion caused by abrupt voltage change, such as during
a lightning storm, AGC designs normally adopt an attack time (or called
settle time) before it adjusts the gain. [106] provides a detailed description
of different AGC designs.
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Variable Strength Sine Signal
Our second attempt was the variable strength signal which we intended to
exploit the delay in AGC adjustments. To be more specific, the signal is a
sine wave at the working frequency (so to pass the filters) which abruptly
increases its strength to create a saturation, and then gradually decimates
to tune down AGC.
The signal can be achieved by multiplying a strong sine wave signal at
the carrier frequency to a controlling sawtooth signal. Denote the carrier
signal VC by:
VC(t) = A sin(ωCt) (3.3)
where ωC = 2475MHz is the carrier frequency in our case. The signal
needs to be strong enough to transiently saturate the ADC when the RF is
detecting environmental noise. Assuming an 8 bit ADC and environmental
noise at −92dBm, VC requires to be theoretically at least −68dBm.
We control the amplitude by a sawtooth signal VS denote by:
VS(t) = −(ωSt mod 1) + 1 (3.4)
where ωS is the frequency of bursts in the signal which is much lower than
ωC and should be slightly lower than the frequency of AGC adjustments.
The desired signal V (t) is thus their product:
V (t) = VC(t)VS(t) (3.5)
The CC2538 user guide[102] describes a programmable register (namely
RFCORE XREG AGCCTRL3) which allows the user to select the AGC
settle timing between 15, 20, 25 and 30 periods with default 20. In the same
document, the description of register RFCORE XREG RFC OBS CTRL0
stated that the random bit at both I and Q channels are updated at 8MHz
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which suggests that the receiver may have a sample rate of 16MHz. Since
the controlling signal should be slightly lower than the AGC adjustment
frequency, this gives us an estimation of sawtooth signal near 0.8MHz.
Ideally, we expect V (t) has the following properties:
1. Capable of passing the band pass filter.
2. Generate bursts that saturates the ADC; therefore bits sampled during
those period results into predicted bits.
We implemented such signal using Gnu Radio Companion[108] with a
HackRF One[109] directly connected to an OpenMote[105]. However, no
significant bias was reported by the NIST test suite. The exact cause of
failure is unknown due to lack of design documentation but one potential
reason might be that the period of transient is too short to significantly affect
the seed.
Strong constant signal
We then attempted a strong constant signal. The idea is to treat the whole
circuit as a deterministic compression function that maps any Vin to {0, 1}.
Under this assumption, the same Vin should always generate the same b,
either 0 or 1. In order to achieve constant Vin in Equation (3.1), Vs needs to
be significantly greater than N to suppress its impact in Equation (3.2), as
any ADC would have only a limited resolution.
For experimental purpose, we have configured three programmable LNAs
in the AGC to their maximum gain (6 + 21 + 9 = 36(dB)) and have disabled
the attenuator in Anti Aliasing Filter (AAF, up to 9dB). We consider these
modifications can be compensated by a strong signal amplifier in practice.
The signal source is implemented by Gnu Radio Companion (GRC)[108]
with HackRF One[109], connected to the target OpenMote through a SMA
cable for the best signal strength. Table 3.1 lists the configuration which
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Table 3.1: GRC Signal Source Configuration





IF Gain [0, 30] dB
Output Voltage Amplitude [0,176.0] mV
effectively generates a carrier wave on desired frequency.
Applying the signal, we observed abnormal 0-runs, i.e. consecutive 0
bits, appeared in the seeds as we increase IF gain to values above 10dB.
Figure 3.5a shows how P (0) is biased and Figure 3.5b shows the average
number of bits of longest 0-runs in each seed. We can see that the bias has
reached its peak at IF Gain = 22dB in both figures. At such gain 27.709%
of the 128 bit seeds have longest 0-runs over 64 bits. It is not a surprise
to see the sampled seeds have failed nearly all tests in the NIST test suite,
indicating they have been strongly biased by our signal. We cannot determine
the exact cause of bias decrease for IF Gain over 22dB due to lack of circuit
design, but one potential cause might be the distortion under strong signal
strength.
We also re-applied the signal to the same OpenMote we previously
used in the strong sine wave signal experiments. A even stronger bias is
observed as shown in Figure 3.6, with 17.820% of the seeds ended in 128
consecutive 0 bits. This may be caused by the strong sine wave signal
in the previous experiments which permanently biased the device. We
therefore restored its AGC configuration to default and re-ran the NIST test
suite but the sampled seed passed all tests as before. We also tested using
example applications provided by Contiki and found no malfunctioning on
the device. The permanent bias does not seem to affect the device under
normal operational status and can only be triggered by the constant signal.
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(a) P (0) to IF Gain
(b) Average longest 0-runs in each seed to IF Gain
Figure 3.5: Biased Seed on OpenMote. Signal source amplitude from 19.5mV
(10dB), 76.0mV(22dB) to 176.0mV (30dB).
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This leads to a very dangerous Trojan-like attack where devices could be
primed in such a way that they remain functional under normal operating
conditions, and eventually ‘activated’ via supplying the activation signal
upon which they are unable to produce random numbers.
Again due to lack of design documentation we can not explain how
exactly the bias is triggered by the signal. Nevertheless our experiments
have demonstrated that sampling seed using RF noise could potentially be
biased by jamming signal and hence potentially breach any cryptographic
protocol relying on the randomness.
3.5 LFSR as PRNG
The instructions for the inbuilt PRNG is given as follows in CC2538 user
guide:
The random-number generator is a 16-bit linear-feedback shift
register (LFSR) with polynomial
x16 + x15 + x2 + 1
(that is, CRC16[110]). It uses different levels of unrolling depend-
ing on the operation it performs. The basic version (no unrolling)
is shown in Figure 16-12.
When used as a PRNG, the in bit in Figure 3.7 is constantly 0. The
Contiki driver calls the PRNG strictly following CC2538 user guide:
“ Another way to update the LFSR is to set the RCTRL
bits in the SOC ADC ADCCON1 register to 01. This clocks
the LFSR once (13x unrolling), and the RCTRL bits in the
2Provided in Figure 3.7
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(a) P (0) to IF Gain
(b) Average longest 0-runs in each seed to IF Gain
Figure 3.6: Biased Seed on OpenMote used in previous experiments. Signal
source amplitude from 19.5mV (10dB), 76.0mV(22dB) to 176.0mV (30dB).
Figure 3.7: CRC16 LFSR (Source: [102])
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SOC ADC ADCCON1 register automatically clear when the op-
eration completes. ” (Section 16.2.1, [102])
In other words, the LFSR is updated by performing 13 CRC16 operations
in Figure 3.7 upon each RNG call. Since the CRC16 is deterministic and
the register has only 16 bits, the PRNG can be modelled as a Deterministic
Finite Automaton (DFA) which made its output easily predictable.
Formally, because there are only 16 bits in the LFSR, we can denote the
universal set of its possible values (or called states) S as:
S = {Si|Si ∈ {0, 1}16} (3.6)
Equation (3.6) implies that the LFSR can have no more than |S| = 216 =
65536 states.
We denote the LFSR update operation, as:
F : S→ S (3.7)
where F is 13 times of CRC16 operation on the current state according to
the manual.




Si+1 = F (Si)
(3.8)
Since S is finite and F is deterministic, the random number stream is
cyclic. The longest non-repetitive PRNG output sequence under seed S∗ can
be represented as:
RS∗ = (F
0(S∗), F 1(S∗), ..., Fn−2(S∗), Fn−1(S∗)) (3.9)
where S∗ = F 0(S∗) = Fn(S∗). Each call to the PRNG effectively returns
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the first element in the sequence and updates it by one cyclic left rotation.
Since the elements within RS∗ are non-repetitive, we have n ≤ |S| for any
RS∗ , i.e. the cycle of PRNG output is at most 65536 calls.
For a re-sampled seed S∗
′
inside RS∗ , i.e. S
∗′ = F k(S∗) where k ∈ Zn,
the corresponding sequence RS∗′ is:
RS∗′ =(F
k(S∗), F k+1(S∗), ..., Fn−1(S∗), F 0(S∗), F 1(S∗), ...,
F k−2(S∗), F k−1(S∗))
(3.10)
Observing Equation (3.9) and Equation (3.10), we can see RS∗ is indeed
RS∗′ left rotated by (n−k) times. This is equivalent to say that S
∗ generates
identical output as S∗
′
with (n − k) preceding calls. As a result, assume
consecutive PRNG calls on RS∗ returns a sequence of:
(Si, Si+1, ..., Sj)
then the same sequence will eventually be replicated by calls on RS∗′ .
This property also indicates that any seed not in RS∗ generates a com-
pletely different sequence. By enumerating S, we found there exists only four
non-overlapping sequence for this CRC16 constructed PRNG, which are:
• R0x0001 with n = 32767.
• R0x0003 with n = 32767.
• R0x0000 with n = 1. (F (0x0000) = 0x0000)
• R0x8003 with n = 1. (F (0x8003) = 0x8003)
Notice that R0x0000 and R0x8003 are excluded in the driver due to their
monadic output according to the manual[102]. The enumeration can be done
on a CC2538 in less than a minute for such a small space of 65536.
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3.6 Contiki RNG Driver Issues for CC2538
Several bugs in Contiki CC2538 RNG driver were also found and reported
in our study. That includes:
1. Reading out of LFSR without ready check.
2. Lack of validity check when reading random seed bits from the RF
module.
3. A bug that drops the Most Significant Bit (MSB) and leaves the Least
Significant Bit (LSB) to be constantly zero in seeding the LFSR.
4. The user guide suggests only to use the lower byte (8 bits) as the
random number output but the driver actually used all 16 bits in the
LFSR.
Note that these bugs may negatively impact the quality of RNG. For
example, reading LFSR without a ready check returns a repetitive output
before update, and reading RF without validation results into a constant
erroneous bit. We have patched the above mentioned bugs before conducting
our experiments in this chapter.
3.7 Security Impact: Breaking DTLS
Similar to the ECC key breach of Smart Energy Profile as pointed out by [84],
the above mentioned PRNG on CC2538 can be exploited to break several
protocols in Datagram TLS (DTLS) which is a widely supported standard
in many IoT applications.
Contiki supports DTLS via an implementation called tinydtls[111]. Two
cipher suites, namely Pre-Shared Key[112] (PSK) and ECDHE ECDSA[113]
are implemented by the latest available version (0.8.2) and the only supported
curve is secp256r1[114]. In this chapter we only discuss ECDHE ECDSA.
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1: procedure EccKeyGen(Domain Parameter T = (p, a, b,G, n, h) as
specified by [114])
2: Randomly select d ∈ [1, n− 1].
3: Compute Q = dG.
4: return (Q, d), where Q is the public key and d the secret key.
5: end procedure
Figure 3.8: ECC Key Generation
Unfortunately, tinydtls does not implement its own RNG; instead it loops
the Contiki API (random rand()) which is then implemented by the CC2538
built-in PRNG (see tinydlts/dtls prng.h) as we described in Section 3.5. As
a result, the generated random numbers are from a very restricted set that is
too small for any cryptographic use. This renders already any key generation
vulnerable.
Figure 3.8 describes the ECC Key Generation. The RNG is involved
in the selection of d. Since T is public, an adversary can pre-compute all
possible public keys by enumerating all secret keys beginning in each position
of R0x0001 and R0x0003. Upon observing a public key, the adversary can
immediately look up its corresponding secret key in the pre-computed look
up table. Since the look up table has only 65534 entries, the pre-computation
took less than 5 minutes on a laptop powered by i7-2620M. Besides rendering
key generation trivially insecure, one can further apply two trivial attacks
during a DTLS handshake. As before, these attacks work easily because
of the poor randomness and the fact that popular EC schemes use public,
standardised base points.
ECDSA ECDSA[115] is an authentication scheme that allows a party to
authenticate a message. In DTLS, it is used to sign the server parameters
(details in [116]) during the handshake to provide server side authenticity.
As described in Figure 3.9, ECDSA requires a secret random number k to
generate a point on the curve R via scalar multiplication of a base point.
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1: procedure EcdsaSign(Domain Parameter T = (p, a, b,G, n, h), server
key pair (Q, d) and a message) to be signed m.
2: Randomly select k ∈ [1, n− 1]].
3: Compute kG = (x1, y1) and let r = x1 mod n.
4: Compute e = SHA-1(m).
5: Compute s = k−1(e+ dr) mod n.
6: return (m, r, s) as the message-signature pair.
7: end procedure
Figure 3.9: ECDSA Signing
The x-coordinate r of this point becomes part of the signature. Hence it can
be observed by the adversary, who can recover k by searching r in the look
up table of pre-computed points. He can then recover the secret signing key
d by computing:
e = SHA− 1(m)
d = r−1(sk − e) mod n
(3.11)
ECDHE ECDHE[113] is a key exchange protocol that allows two party
to derive a shared secret. In DTLS, ECDHE is performed at the end of
DTLS handshake to derive a shared secret, which is then used to derive the
symmetric session key for application data encryption.
Figure 3.10 provides a brief description of ECDHE. The adversary can
recover rA and rB by observing QA and QB that is being sent in the packets;
hence computes K to derive the symmetric key.
Because G is public, it is again possible to derive rA and rB by looking
up QA and QB in the pre-computed table. Once these quantities are known
to the adversaries, they can also compute QAB and hence the session key.
We have tested the above attacks by sniffing two CC2538 nodes performing
handshake using the example code provided by tinydtls. The secret keys
have been successfully recovered using the look up table we generated.
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1: procedure EcdheKeyExchange(Domain Parameter T =
(p, a, b,G, n, h). Party A’s key pair (QA, dA) and party B’s key
pair (QB, dB))
2: A randomly picks rA ∈ [0, n− 1].
3: B randomly picks rB ∈ [0, n− 1].
4: A computes QA = rAG and sends QA to B.
5: B computes QB = rBG and sends QB to A.
6: Both A and B computes QAB = rArBG = rAQB = rBQA.
7: return Both A and B returns K = Hash(QAB) as the shared secret.
8: end procedure
Figure 3.10: ECDHE Key Exchange
s t a t i c unsigned long seed = 1 ;
i n t
rand ( void )
{
r e turn do rand (&rand ) ;
}
Figure 3.11: rand() implementations in stdlib
3.8 Other RNG implementations in Contiki
Investigating (P)RNG implementations in other platforms supported by
Contiki, we realised that most of them do not have dedicated PRNG imple-
mentations and by default wrap rand() in stdlib as their PRNG. We traced
some of the open sourced stdlib implementations. For the majority of the
libraries, i.e. stdlib for ARM[117], AVR[118] and MSP430[119], the rand()
implementation can be abstracted as Figure 3.11. The type of variable seed
may vary on different platforms. The do rand() function outputs a congruent
of linear transformation of seed and updates seed by the output.
It is clear that such design would also yield into a predictable random
number stream with cycle no longer than the range of seed, as the same seed
returns the same output. On the above platforms, the cycles are no longer
than 232, 216 and 216 calls respectively.
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3.9 Patching the PRNG
The PRNG issues can be efficiently patched by using more sophisticated
PRNG implementation for cryptographic applications, such as switch to
constructions based on approved hash functions and block ciphers as recom-
mended by [96]. Specifically for CC2538, SHA-256 and AES have hardware
coprocessor support and therefore can be considered candidates for imple-
menting cryptographically secure PRNG according to [96].
Nevertheless, any secure PRNG still needs to be seeded by a secure TRNG.
It is unfortunate that the approach taken for the CC2538, which is based on
reusing an existing radio module with no protection against active adversaries,
fails to meet even basic requirements as we demonstrated inSection 3.4.2.
Therefore despite all the cryptographic co-processors provided, we would
not recommend the device, i.e. CC2538, to be used for critical security
applications.
3.10 Summary
In this chapter we reviewed the provision for cryptographic random numbers
on the CC2538 and related devices. First, we discussed the poor choice of
using a 16 bit LFSR as PRNG and demonstrated how this design flaw can
be exploited to break DTLS running on these devices. We also found that
the provision for randomness within the popular Contiki software and DTLS
implementation tinydtls is inadequate. Any open source efforts, or indeed
also any products, that built on them should review their instantiation of
random numbers carefully.
We also investigated how to tamper with the RF source and showed in
practice how to configure signals to that end. We reverse engineered the
design of the path that produces random bits from the RF module, and
developed some attacks that can bias the random bits in practice. This
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shows that even if the poor PRNG was replaced with a sound one, the source
for the seed of any PRNG on the CC2538 is vulnerable to practical attacks.
However, the signal strength required for the attack might not be achievable
unless the adversary have direct physical access to the device.
We believe that the same design choices have also been adopted by
many other products in the CC series including CC2420[120], CC2430[98],
CC2520[103] and CC253X, CC2540/41 series[99]; thus all these products
suffer from the same problems. Only the latest CC26XX/CC13XX[121] series
has abandoned this design and implemented a dedicated RNG suitable for




DPA on ARX Ciphers
4.1 Introduction
The IoT boom in the recent years has drawn a great interest into the research
of lightweight cryptography. Among different approaches being adopted to
design lightweight ciphers, the ARX paradigm is particularly interesting to
the side channel research community, partly due to its seemingly “inherent
resilience” against side channel attacks. Remarkably, the work done by
Biryukov et al. [70] studied various instructions used to construct lightweight
ciphers and concluded:
“ The software implementations of the three ARX designs
we considered are characterized by a certain level of “intrinsic”
resilience against CPA. ... These features make ARX construc-
tions excellent candidates for the implementation of lightweight
block ciphers for the IoT. ” (Conclusion, [70])
Such “intrinsic” resilience is greatly appealing to IoT designers as many
resource constrained devices cannot afford the overheads brought by coun-
termeasures against side channel attacks.
This chapter extends the result of [70] into a practical scenario where
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we thoroughly studied the above claimed side channel resilience of ARX
ciphers against various DPA attacks. It is based on my unpublished work
co-authored with Elisabeth Oswald and Srinivas Venkatesh. As the main
author I was responsible for conducting all experiments in this chapter as
well as proposing the chosen message DPA strategy described in Section 4.5.
My college Srinivas Venkatesh has contributed in part to the mathematical
formalisations in this work.
This chapter begins by presenting some practical concerns when targeting
the only non-linear operation in ARX-Boxes, i.e., modular addition, in
Section 4.3, followed by experiments in Section 4.4 and a novel chosen
message DPA strategy in Section 4.5. We then demonstrate the practical
results when targeting the linear operations in ARX-Boxes, i.e., XOR and
rotation, in Section 4.6 and conclude the chapter in Section 4.7.
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 Notations
In Chapter 4 we frequently require the notation of a specific bit in the binary
presentation of a variable x. The notation [x] indicates the binary repres-




denotes the i-th bit of [x]. The notation [x][y] implies the concatenation of
two bit strings [x] and [y]. The notation [x]k denotes k times repetition of
[x]. Specifically, [∗]k denotes an arbitrary k-bit string.
We are mostly concerned with modular addition, logical rotation (abbre-
viate as rotation) and XOR operations over the field Z2n . We denote them
as:
• x y: (x+ y) mod 2n
• x >> y: Right rotate x by y bits.
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• x << y: Left rotate x by y bits which equates to x >> (n− y).
• x⊕ y: Exclusive-or of x and y.
We often require to be able to change the value of a bit to its (one’s)
complement (i.e. we flip a bit, but leave all other bits unchanged). For this
purpose we define the flip function Fi(x) which returns x with the i-th bit
flipped:
Fi(x) = x⊕ 2i
4.2.2 SPARX Round Function and Generalised ARX-Box
SPARX [66] is a recently published ARX cipher that bases its round function
on SPECKEY [66]. The SPARX round function takes a 32-bit input and
divides this in two equal halves. The two halves are firstly XOR-ed with
some key material, and then a modular addition  takes place (one of the
inputs to this addition is also rotated), which is then the left half, as depicted
in Figure 4.1a.
Whilst the rotations are important with respect to the cipher’s resilience
against classical cryptanalysis, these rotations, which are based on known
constants, do not add to the cipher’s resilience against side channel attacks.
Typical DPA-style attacks target these operations in the first (or last) cipher
round, and thus because the rotations are based on known values, they can
be easily incorporated into any side-channel distinguisher at no extra cost.
Thus in our study, we consider a simplified ARX structure that omits the
rotation in the SPARX round function which can be represented as:
s = S(x, y) = (x⊕ α)  (y ⊕ β) (4.1)
where (x, y) are the inputs, (α, β) the secret keys, and all variables are in the
field Z2n . Figure 4.1b presents the circuit that is equivalent to Equation (4.1).
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(a) SPARX round function
(b) Generalised ARX-Box S(x, y)
Note that most ARX-Boxes can be reduced to the form of Equation (4.1)
by substituting the inputs. For example, the upper half of SPARX ARX-Box
(up to the modular addition) is equivalent to setting:
x = x′ << 7
α = α′ << 7
(4.2)
The lower half of the right branch (from << 2) in Figure 4.1a can also be
merged into the second round in a similar manner.
Take SKEIN [64] (Figure 4.2) for another example where the plaintext
is directly added to the key. The initial subkey addition can be generalised
into Equation (4.1) as:
s = S(x, 0) = (x⊕ 0)  (0⊕ β)
by setting the plaintext to x and Subkey 0 to β, and letting α = y = 0.
Our experiments are focused on the SPARX cipher for two reasons. First
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Figure 4.2: Skein hash function (Source: [122])
of all, it is the first ARX construction with a provable crypto-analytical
bound [66]. Secondly, it has a public available reference implementation in
C which can be easily ported to various platforms. However, the analytical
aspect of our work is generally applicable to arbitrary ARX ciphers through
reductions as explained above.
To our knowledge, only minimum work has been done on the side channel
aspects of ARX-ciphers with practical results. The closest was published in
[71] where the authors proposed to improve the straightforward correlation
attack on a ARM M3 processor against the ARX-Box of SKEIN through
testing pairs of correlation peaks. However, this approach requires one of
the adders to be known to the adversary and thus not compatible with
our generalised ARX-Box. [123] reported another relevant result where
the authors successfully recovered the key of the SPECK cipher [65] in a
straightforward correlation attack targeting the writing back of the output
of key XOR. We consider the result of [123] as a supporting evidence of
[70] where the later reported that memory instructions, such as read and
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write, produce leakages in a much higher magnitude comparing to arithmetic
instructions. Nevertheless, as will be shown later in Section 4.6, the same
target function could still be vulnerable against DPA attacks in the naive
reference implementation of the SPARX ARX-Box, even though the operands
are manipulated only in the registers.
4.3 Observations on Modular Addition as a DPA
Target
The effectiveness of a DPA style attack is commonly evaluated by the number
of traces required to recover the key. It is generally perceived that completely
linear targets such as the XOR and rotation operations are difficult to attack
with DPA: attacks on such targets require many more traces than attacks
on highly non-linear target functions, and even with very large numbers
of leakages there remains some keys that cannot be distinguished from
each other [124]. This statement is further supported by [70] where the
authors reported the difficulties of independent correlation attacks using HW
predictions against the XOR and rotation instructions.
Considering the fact that modular addition is the only non-linear opera-
tion in an ARX-Box, it is naturally the primary target for DPA attacks as
explained by [70]. However, we realised that straightforward DPA methods
might not be as effective as they generally are against S-Boxes; for instance,
the case of AES described in [30]. In this section, we address some issues
that should be concerned when targeting modular addition in a DPA attack.
4.3.1 Equivalent Keys
Our study found that one cannot achieve a first order success exploiting
only the leakage of modular addition due to the existence of two types of
equivalent keys, i.e., keys cannot be distinguished from each other.
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Proposition 1. It holds that:
(x⊕ α)  (y ⊕ β) = (x⊕Fn−1(α))  (y ⊕Fn−1(β)) (4.3)
for arbitrary x and y.
Proof. Let 
s = (x⊕ α)  (y ⊕ β)
s′ = (x⊕Fn−1(α))  (y ⊕Fn−1(β))
(4.4)
Specifically, the MSBs of s∗ and s′ can be represented as:
[s]n−1 = ([x]n−1 ⊕ [α]n−1)⊕ ([y]n−1 ⊕ [β]n−1)⊕ cn−1
[s′]n−1 = ([x]n−1 ⊕ [Fn−1(α)]n−1)⊕ ([y]n−1 ⊕ [Fn−1(β)]n−1)⊕ c′n−1
(4.5)
where cn−1 and c
′
n−1 are the carry bits of s and s
′ generated at their previous
n− 1 bits. Since (α, β) and (Fn−1(α),Fn−1(β′)) only differ at their MSBs, s




Therefore by XOR Equation (4.4), we have
s⊕ s′ = [s]n−1 ⊕ [s′]n−1
= [̃α]n−1 ⊕ [α]n−1 ⊕ [̃β]n−1 ⊕ [β]n−1 = 0
(4.7)
Hence
s = s′ (4.8)
Proposition 1 implies that (Fn−1(α),Fn−1(β)) will always result in the
same modular sum and thus the same as leakage as the correct key (α, β);
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therefore they cannot be distinguished from each other.
“Generic” distinguishers, which we explain in more detail in Chapter 5,
cannot distinguish keys when their corresponding hypothetical intermediates
are permutations of each other [125]. Proposition 2 shows that additional
equivalent keys should be taken into account for this class of distinguishers.
Proposition 2. Let (xi, yi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ t be t pairs of input to an ARX-Box.
For the following equation:
(x1 ⊕ α)  (y1 ⊕ β) = (x2 ⊕ α)  (y2 ⊕ β) = . . . = (xt ⊕ α)  (yt ⊕ β) (4.9)
there exist at least 8 pairs of (α, β) that satisfies.
To prove Proposition 2, we first prove Proposition 3 and Proposition 4.
Proposition 3. Let (α, β) be a solution to Equation (4.9), then there exists
at least 4 solutions to Equation (4.9) given as
{(α, β), (α′, β), (α, β′), (α′, β′)}
where 
α′ = 2n−1 ⊕ α
β′ = 2n−1 ⊕ β
Proof. Flipping the MSB of α is arithmetically equivalent to adding ±2n−1.
Therefore denote:
α⊕ x = α′ ⊕ x⊕ 2n−1 = α′ ⊕ x+ ∆
where ∆ ∈ ±2n−1. It follows that:
Sα,β(x, y) = (x⊕ α)  (y ⊕ β)
= (x⊕ α′ + ∆)  (y ⊕ β)
= Sα′,β(x, y) + ∆ = Sα′,β(x, y)⊕ 2n−1
(4.10)
62
CHAPTER 4. DPA ON ARX CIPHERS
for arbitrary (x, y).
Since (α, β) is a solution to Equation (4.9), for any i 6= j, substitute
Equation (4.10):
Sα,β(xi, yi) = Sα,β(xj , yj)
Sα′,β(xi, yi)⊕ 2n−1 = Sα′,β(xj , yj)⊕ 2n−1
Sα′,β(xi, yi) = Sα′,β(xj , yj)
Thus (α′, β) is also a solution to Equation (4.9).
Due to the symmetry of α and β, it can be easily proved that:
Sα,β′(xi, yi) = Sα,β′(xj , yj) (4.11)
for any i 6= j.
Applying Equation (4.10) twice to both (α, β), we have:
Sα′,β′(xi, yi) = Sα′,β′(xj , yj) (4.12)
for any i 6= j.
Therefore if (α, β) is a solution to Equation (4.9), then (α′, β), (α, β′)
and (α′, β′) are also solutions to Equation (4.9).
Note that Proposition 1 is indeed a special case of Proposition 3 under
the condition of a specific value of ([α]n−1 ⊕ [β]n−1).
Proposition 4. If (α, β) is a solution to Equation (4.9), then (α̃, β̃) is also
a solution to Equation (4.9), where
α̃ = (2n − 1)⊕ α
β̃ = (2n − 1)⊕ β
(4.13)
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Proof. Since (α̃, β̃) are complements of (α, β); therefore
(α̃⊕ x, β̃ ⊕ y)
also complements
(α⊕ x, β ⊕ y)
for arbitrary (x, y).
Hence we have: 
x⊕ α = 2n − 1− (x⊕ α̃)
y ⊕ β = 2n − 1− (y ⊕ β̃)
(4.14)
Therefore
Sα,β(x, y) = (x⊕ α)  (y ⊕ β)
= (2n − 1− (x⊕ α̃))  (2n − 1− (y ⊕ β̃))
= 2n+1 − 2− Sα̃,β̃(x, y)
(4.15)
for arbitrary (x, y).
Since (α, β) is a solution to Equation (4.9), for any i 6= j, we have:
Sα,β(xi, yi) = Sα,β(xj , yj)
2n+1 − 2− Sα̃,β̃(xi, yi) = 2
n+1 − 2− Sα̃,β̃(xj , yj)
Sα̃,β̃(xi, yi) = Sα̃,β̃(xj , yj)
(4.16)
which implies (α̃, β̃) is also a solution to Equation (4.9).
Given the correct key (α, β), Proposition 3 derives 2 pairs of equivalent
keys. Each of these equivalent keys derives another 4 pairs of equivalent
keys and thus Proposition 2 is proven. Note that, for generic distinguishers,
equivalent keys in Proposition 2 result in partitions that are permutations of
each other and as such are indistinguishable.
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4.3.2 Ineffective Single Bit DPA
Single bit DPA is ineffective against modular addition. Observe that the
i-bit of the modular sum [s]i can be represented as:
[s]i = ([x]i ⊕ [α]i)  ([y]i ⊕ [β]i) + ci = [x]i ⊕ [α]i ⊕ [y]i ⊕ [β]i ⊕ ci (4.17)
where ci denotes the carry bit from adding the previous bits and specifically
c0 = 0. Equation (4.17) implies that single bit key guesses ([α]i, [β]i) and
([̃α]i, [̃β]i) are equivalent and thus cannot be distinguished from each other
in a DPA attack. Consequently, applying single bit DPA on each bit of s
only recovers α⊕ β and reduces the key space from 22n to 2n, which might
still be costly in practice.
4.3.3 The Enumeration Space and Divide-and-conquer
When single bit DPA is not viable as we explained in Section 4.3.2, the
adversary will have to perform multi bit DPA attacks. Note that determining
s requires the adversary to simultaneously enumerate both α and β. For
n-bit operands, this implies the key enumeration space is 22n which quickly
becomes impractical as n increases. Take SPARX [66] for example: its 16
bit operands implies 232 keys need to be enumerated which could be costly
in practice.
Alternatively, a general solution to reduce the key enumeration space is
the divide-and-conquer strategy that recovers (α, β) chunk-wise. Denote by
sc, αc, βc, xc, yc the l-bits chunks starting from the i-th bit of s, α, β, x, y
respectively and their corresponding previous bits as sp, αp, βp, xp and yp.
Observe that:
sc = (xc ⊕ αc)  (yc ⊕ βc)  ci (4.18)
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where ci, the carry bit from adding the previous bits, can be expressed as:
ci =

0 if (xp ⊕ αp) + (yp ⊕ βp) < 2i
1 otherwise
(4.19)
and specifically c0 = 0.
Equation (4.18) indeed suggests a naive approach of divide-and-conquer
by recursively recovering the key bits from LSB to MSB. However, it can
be easily proved that Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 also apply to each
chunk. Therefore, in such a straightforward divide-and-conquer approach,
all equivalent keys recovered in each chunk will have to be carried out into
the next chunk, resulting in a key space which exponentially explodes with
the number of chunks.
Reviewing Proposition 1 and Proposition 3, we notice that the equivalent
keys only differ at their MSBs; thus, attacking each chunk indeed recovers
the unique lower l − 1 bits of (αc, βc). Exploiting this feature, by dropping
the MSBs of (αc, βc) and overlapping them with the LSBs of the next chunk,
one can avoid equivalent keys and uniquely recover the lower order of l − i
bits (αc, βc), except for the last chunk where there is no next chunk to be
overlapped. Applying this overlapping method, we managed to reduce the
resulting key space in a divide-and-conquer attack to 2 in general and 4 for
generic distinguishers.
4.3.4 Weak Non-linearity
Despite being the only non-linear component in ARX ciphers, modular
addition is known to be only weakly non-linear, the impact of which has
been previously reported by Lemke et al. [126].
In general, consider a simplified modular addition
x k = z
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Flipping the higher bits of k leaves the lower order bits of the sum z unchanged.
For instance, in an extreme case, flipping the MSB of k (or x) is a linear
operation, because:
k′ = k ⊕ 2n−1 =⇒ (x k)⊕ (x k′) = 2n−1
that is, only the MSB of z is flipped in response.
In terms of DPA attacks, this implies that, given a set of plaintexts and a
number of key guesses including k′ as just described, the intermediate values
related to the sum z are identical in most bits. Consequently, for typical
linear leakage models, their resulting hypothetical leakages will be very close,
making it hard to distinguish between the correct key guess and “similar”
incorrect key guesses.
4.4 Correlation Attacks Against Modular Addition
With the observations of Section 4.3 in mind, we implemented a classic
correlation attack using Pearson’s correlation with HW predictions against
modular addition. Remark that the optimisation proposed in [71] is not an
option in our generalised ARX-Box as it requires the knowledge of one of
the adders, while both are unknown in our case. Our implementation targets
the lowest 4 bits for a practical key enumeration space (28); thus 2 pairs of
equivalent keys are expected at the end of this attack. The 4 bit attack can
be extended to all 16 bits of (α, β) as we explained in Section 4.3.3.
We first applied the attack on traces simulated as the HW of s with
additive Gaussian noise at an SNR setting of 21. The attack successfully
recovered the key using 500 traces as we show in Figure 4.3a. Our observations
in Section 4.3 are also reflected in Figure 4.3a in the sense that:
• Figure 4.3a is symmetric, with each key having exactly one equivalent
counterpart as expected in Section 4.3.1. The correct key (0x0, 0x3) and
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its equivalents (0x8, 0xB) are together showing the highest (absolute
value of) correlations of 0.406.
• Many of the incorrect key candidates are also showing significant cor-
relations in Figure 4.3a, which confirms the prediction of Section 4.3.4.
Decreasing the SNR to 2−3 caused the attack fail with the same number
of traces, as showed in Figure 4.3b. Even though the correct key(s) still
showed a significant correlation of 0.179, an incorrect key candidate showed
an even higher correlation, which could be explained by Section 4.3.4.
We carried the experiments over real traces collected on an ARM Cortex-
M0 [127] housed on a SCALE board executing SPARX-64/128 with the
reference C implementation [128]. The SNR of this device, estimated by the
method proposed in [12], was 2.823 for all 16 bits of s and 0.043 for the 4
targeted bits. Although the correlations are basically stabilised for more
than 1000 traces, the attack failed even with 2000 traces as we present in
Figure 4.4. We additionally show the correlations of all 16 bits of s under
the full key (0x2200, 2233) in Figure 4.4a for reference.
In Figure 4.4a, the correlation of our 4 targeted bits reaches its peak
0.098 at time point 465 synchronously with the referenced full key correlation.
The selected time point is unlikely to be false positive; however, the correct
key failed to be distinguished at this time point as we show in Figure 4.4b.
We suspect two major factors that might have contributed to this result:
• The character of the leakage of the addition instruction on our targeted
device was not well captured by the HW prediction.
• Ghost peaks due to the confusing incorrect key candidates as explained
in Section 4.3.4.
In a non-profiling scenario, the adversary is unable to acquire an accurate
prediction model for the correlation attack and has to rely on a classic model,
68
CHAPTER 4. DPA ON ARX CIPHERS

















2nd best key guess (0x4,0xF)
(a) SNR=21

















Key with max correlation (0x6,0xD)
(b) SNR=2−3
Figure 4.3: Correlations for SPARX modular addition using 500 simulated
traces
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Evolution of correlations over time
Full sub keys (0x2200,0x2233)
4 LSB of sub keys (0x0,0x3)
(a) Evolution of the correlations


















(b) Correlations of all key candidates at point 465
Figure 4.4: CPA on modular addition with 2000 traces
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typically the HW, which we have shown to be ineffective in our experiments.
Therefore we consider our results so far as evidence of the claimed “intrinsic
resilience” of ARX ciphers stated in [70].
4.5 A Chosen Message DPA Against Modular Ad-
dition
In this section, we propose a novel chosen message DPA strategy against
modular addition that was inspired by [129] and [130]. The new strategy
features a computational complexity which scales linearly with the size of
operands n, and can be used as an alternative to the divide-and-conquer
approach. However, this attack imposes a relatively strong assumption on
the leakage behaviour of target device, i.e. the measured leakage requires
to be proportional to the Hamming Weight of the data being processed;
therefore the method may lack practical implication on certain ar-
chitectures that do not hold the above assumption of Hamming
Weight leakage.
In a nutshell, our novel attack technique requires chosen inputs and
recovers α, β using 2 · c · (n + 1) leakages (c is a constant), and minimal,
constant computational overhead. The attack requires the adversary to first
obtain the leakage of an arbitrary pair of “base” input (x, y), and then the
leakages of “alternative” inputs {Fi(x), y} for i ∈ [0, n− 1], that is, inputs
with one bit of x flipped for each bit of x from the MSB to the LSB. By
observing the differences induced by flipping each bit of x, the adversary
first recovers the modular sum corresponding to the base input (x, y) and
then derives (α, β) by solving a set of equations.
Our approach first tackles this in an ideal, non-noisy leakage scenario,
thus L(x, y) = HW (s). Note that each of the chosen pairs of messages is
identical to (x, y) except for one bit. We show that the change in Hamming
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weights provides sufficient information to successively recover the bits of s
starting from the most significant bit. With the same idea, we also recover
s(x̃, y) (where x̃ refers to the one’s complement of x). Using S(x, y) and
s(x̃, y) we construct a set of two equations, which enable us to solve for
(α, β).
A technical detail is that the presence of two exclusive-or operations as
well as a modular addition operation slightly complicates the analysis of the
effect of flipping a bit of the message x on HW (S(x, y)). We handle this
by expressing the effect of flipping the ith bit of x as corresponding to a
difference of +2i or −2i for S(x, y). Though we do not know the difference
exactly, we show that using the change in Hamming weights we can predict
the exact difference.
Finally, using some standard DPA techniques, we solve the noisy leakage
case (i.e., the leakage is now HW (S(x, y)) + Gaussian noise) essentially by
replacing comparisons between Hamming weights with statistical tests.
4.5.1 Formalisation of Attack
To describe our new algorithm, we first formalise attacking the ARX key
exploiting the ideal and noisy HW leakage as the Hidden Adder Problem
(HAP, Definition 2) and Noisy Hidden Adder Problem (NHAP, Definition 3),
respectively.
Definition 2 (Hidden Adder Problem (HAP)). Let (α, β) be randomly
chosen from Z2n × Z2n . The adversary chooses pairs x, y ∈ Z2n and obtains
leakage of the form HW (S(x, y)) = HW ((x⊕ α)  (y ⊕ β)) for each of the
pairs. The adversary must then recover (α, β).
Definition 3 (Noisy Hidden Adder Problem (NHAP)). Let (α, β) be ran-
domly chosen from Z2n × Z2n. The adversary chooses pairs x, y ∈ Z2n and
obtains leakage of the form Lα,β(x, y) = HW (S(x, y)) + e = HW ((x⊕ α) 
(y ⊕ β)) + e where e ∼ N (0, σ2). The adversary must then recover (α, β).
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Notice that both the HAP (as well as NHAP) have exactly two solutions,
as we have proved in Proposition 1. Indeed, through the execution of our
algorithm it is provable that there exists two and only two solutions to HAP.
To explain our attack, we now define two sub-problems of HAP and
NHAP called the Hidden Sum Problem (HSP) and the Noisy Hidden Sum
Problem (NHSP), as described in Definition 4 and Definition 5.
Definition 4 (Hidden Sum Problem (HSP)). Let (α, β) be randomly chosen
from Z2n × Z2n . The adversary chooses pairs x, y ∈ Z2n and obtains leakage
of the form HW (S(x, y)) = HW ((x ⊕ α)  (y ⊕ β)) for each of the pairs.
The adversary must then recover S(x, y).
Definition 5 (Noisy Hidden Sum Problem (NHSP)). Let (α, β) be randomly
chosen from Z2n × Z2n . The adversary chooses pairs x, y ∈ Z2n and obtains
leakage of the form Lα,β(x, y) = HW (S(x, y))+e = HW ((x⊕α)(y⊕β))+e
where e ∼ N (0, σ2). The adversary must then recover S(x, y).
The adversaries in HSP and NHSP are given exactly the same form of
leakage as in the adder problems (HAP and NHAP). Only their goals are
changed to recover the sum S(x, y) in the sum problems rather than the
sub-keys in the adder problems. Later, in Section 4.5.4, we will show that
HAP can be reduced to HSP.
Without loss of generality, we always consider the general case where
n ≥ 2. For the special case where n = 1, we have
HW (S(x, y)) = S(x, y) = x⊕ α⊕ y ⊕ β
which immediately gives (α, β) given HW (S(x, y)), x and y.
4.5.2 Solving the Hidden Sum Problem
Our solution to the HSP recursively recovers S(x, y) one bit at a time.
Starting from the MSB down to the LSB, we flip each bit of x and observe
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the resulting differences in the HW leakage. In the end we recover all bits of
the hidden sum S(x, y).
Since flipping [x]i also flips the bit [x⊕ α]i, this effectively changes the
sum by ±2i due to commutativity of addition. In the following sections we
explain how to exploit this property of S(x, y) to solve HSP.
Define ∆sy([x]i) to be the difference in S(x, y) induced by flipping [x]i.
We have:
∆sy([x]i) ≡ s(Fi(x), y)− S(x, y) ≡ ±2i (mod 2n). (4.20)
Equivalently,
s(Fi(x), y) = S(x, y)± 2i. (4.21)
Recovering the MSB
In this section we give a solution that recovers the MSB of s, which is the
base case for our algorithm.
Recall Equation (4.5) that flipping [x]n−1 effectively flips [s]n−1; thus the
adversary can determine that [s]n−1 = 0 if the HW increases (from 0 to 1)
and vice versa.
Lemma 1. Given an arbitrary chosen input x, y, HW of the sums S(x, y)
and s(Fn−1(x), y), the MSB of the sum s is:
[s]n−1 =

0 if HW (s′n−1)−HW (s) > 0,
1 if HW (s′n−1)−HW (s) < 0.
Proof. We can write HW (s) as:
HW (s) = HW ([s]n−1) +HW ([s]n−2[s]n−3...[s]1[s]0). (4.22)
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Also,
s′n−1 ≡ ∆sy([x]n−1) + s ≡ ∆sy([x]n−1) + [s]n−12n−1ni +
n−2∑
i=0
[s]i · 2i (mod 2n).
(4.23)
Note that [s]n−1 ∈ {0, 1}, ∆sy([x]n−1) ∈ {+2n−1,−2n−1} according to Equa-
tion (4.20), and −2n−1 mod 2n = +2n−1. Equation (4.23) can, therefore,
be categorised into four cases:
1. If [s]n−1 = 0, ∆sy([x]n−1) = +2
n−1, then
s′n−1 = (+2




i) mod 2n = [1][s]n−2...[s]1[s]0.
2. If [s]n−1 = 0, ∆sy([x]n−1) = −2n−1, then




i) mod 2n = [1][s]n−2...[s]1[s]0.
3. If [s]n−1 = 1, ∆sy([x]n−1) = +2
n−1, then
s′n−1 = (+2




i) mod 2n = [0][s]n−2...[s]1[s]0.
4. If [s]n−1 = 1, ∆sy([x]n−1) = −2n−1, then




i) mod 2n = [0][s]n−2...[s]1[s]0.
Observe that in Cases 1 and 2, where [s]n−1 = 0, we have
s′n−1 = [1][s]n−2...[s]1[s]0.
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Algorithm 1 Compute MSB of s
function [s]n−1 = GetMsb(x, y)
∆HW = HW (s′n−1)−HW (s);











HW (1) +HW ([s]n−2[s]n−3...[s]1[s]0) if [s]n−1 = 0,
HW (0) +HW ([s]n−2[s]n−3...[s]1[s]0) if [s]n−1 = 1.
(4.24)
Denote by ∆HWn−1 the (signed) difference in HW between s and s
′
n−1.
Subtracting Equation (4.24) by Equation (4.22), we have:




HW (1)−HW (0) = +1 if [s]n−1 = 0,
HW (0)−HW (1) = −1 if [s]n−1 = 1.
(4.25)
Observing Equation (4.25), we can see that the sign of ∆HWn−1 solely
depends on [s]n−1. Since both HW (s
′
n−1) and HW (s) can be obtained as
(ideal) leakage, we can thus recover [s]n−1 by computing ∆HWn−1 and then
applying Equation (4.25).
Algorithm 1 provides the pseudo code for recovering the MSB.
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Recovering the m-th bit
In Section 4.5.2 we explained how the MSB of s = S(x, y) can be recovered
from the noiseless HW leakage. We now show how to recover the remaining
bits.
Lemma 2. Suppose we flip the bit [x]n−m. If:
• HW (s′n−m) > HW (s), then [s]n−m = 0,
• HW (s′n−m) = HW (s), then [s]n−m = [̃s]n−(m−1),
• HW (s′n−m) < HW (s), then [s]n−m = 1,
for 2 ≤ m ≤ n.
Proof. We assume that the higher-order m− 1 bits of s:
sknown = [s]n−1[s]n−2...[s]n−(m−1)
have been determined. The goal is then to recover the next bit [s]n−m.
According to Equation (4.21), when [x]n−m is flipped, we obtain the flipped
sum s′n−m:
s′n−m = s+ ∆sy([x]n−m) (4.26)
where ∆sy([x]n−m) = ±2n−m.
In the RHS of Equation (4.26), bits “lower” than [s]n−m are unchanged
after the addition operation and thus do not affect the HW. On the other
hand, the addition to (or subtraction from) [s]n−m may potentially generate
a carry bit that propagates through bits “higher” than [s]n−m and results in
a change of HW.
Let ∆HWn−m be the (signed) change of HW induced by flipping [x]n−m:
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We can categorise ∆HWn−m by:
• Whether or not there exists a carry bit (either positive or negative),
• If there does exist a carry bit, then
– Whether the carry triggers an overflow (and hence modular re-
duction).
We next analyse each of the above cases.
No carry bit. In the following conditions there is no carry bit:
1. If [s]n−m = 0 and ∆sy([x]n−m) = +2
n−m, then ∆HWn−m = +1.
2. If [s]n−m = 1 and ∆sy([x]n−m) = −2n−m, then ∆HWn−m = −1.
Otherwise there must exist a carry bit.
Carry bit. The existence of a carry bit implies that either one of the
following condition is satisfied:
• Case C1 : [s]n−m = 1 and ∆sy([x]n−m) = +2n−m.
• Case C2 : [s]n−m = 0 and ∆sy([x]n−m) = −2n−m.
is satisfied. This can be further categorised into:
Overflow. In this case, all the bits of sknown are flipped after the
addition:
1. In Case C1, it is required that sknown = [1]
m−1. The propaga-
tion results in sknown flipped to [0]
m−1, with ∆HWn−m =
−m.
2. In Case C2, it is required that sknown = [0]
m−1. The propaga-
tion results in sknown flipped to [1]
m−1, with ∆HWn−m =
+m.
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Conditions
∆HWn−m[s]n−m ∆sy([x]n−m) Overflow? sknown
[0]








−2n−m No [∗]m−1 -1
Table 4.1: ∆HW under different conditions, where 2 ≤ m ≤ n, 0 ≤ k ≤ m.
No overflow. In this case, only a part of sknown is flipped after adding
∆sy([x]n−m). Denote by k ∈ [0,m− 2] the number of bits flipped
in sknown before the carry propagation terminates, then
1. In Case C1, the carry propagation terminates at the least
significant [0] of sknown which is required to have the form
sknown = [s]n−1...[s]n−(m−(k+2))[0][1]
k.





Therefore ∆HWn−m = −k.
2. Case C2 is just the opposite of C1 with ∆HWn−m = +k.
Table 4.1 summarises the above scenarios. It is shown in the table that
positive ∆HWn−m implies [s]n−m = [0] and negative ∆HWn−m implies
[s]n−m = [1] when both m, k ≥ 0. The case ∆HWn−m = 0 is only possible
when k = 0, which indicates that a carry bit exists without overflow. Referring
to Table 4.1, in such a case sknown is required to be either:
• sknown = [∗]m−2[1], for [s]n−m = 0, or
• sknown = [∗]m−2[0], for [s]n−m = 1.
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Algorithm 2 Compute m-th significant bit [s]n−m (2 ≤ m ≤ n)
function [s]n−m = GetNextBit(x, y,m, [s]n−1[s]n−2...[s]n−(m−1))
∆HW = HW (s′n−1)−HW (s); . Refer Table 4.1
if ∆HW > 0 then
return 0;
else if ∆HW < 0 then
return 1;
else . ∆HW == 0







In either case, [s]n−m can be determined by the LSB of sknown. To summarise,
given ∆HWn−m, we can uniquely determine [s]n−m from Table 4.1.
Algorithm 2 provides the psuedo code to compute sn−m for 2 ≤ m ≤ n.
4.5.3 Complete Solution to HSP
Combining the methods described in Section 4.5.2 and Section 4.5.2, we now
have a full solution to the HSP, as summarised in Algorithm 3. Notice that
the same HW (s) can indeed be reused in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 ;
hence Algorithm 3 only needs n+ 1 traces to recover S(x, y).
Algorithm 3 Compute s
function s = GetSum(x, y)
. We initialise the sum to its MSB
s = GetMsb(x, y);
. Recover one bit at a time from 2nd MSB to LSB
for (m = 2;m ≤ n;m+ +) do
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4.5.4 Solving HAP
In this section we show how HAP (cf. Definition 2) can be solved using a
solution to HSP (cf. Section 4.5.2).
Lemma 3. Let ∆ := ((S(x, y)− s(x̃, y)−1) (mod 2n)) >> 1. The solutions
to HAP are:

α = ∆⊕ x
β = y ⊕ ((S(x, y)−∆) (mod 2n))
or 
α = (∆  2n−1)⊕ x
β = y ⊕ ((S(x, y)− (∆ + 2n−1)) (mod 2n)),
for arbitrary x, y ∈ Z2n.
Proof. Observe that for any x ∈ Z2n , we have
x̃⊕ α = x̃⊕ α = 2n − 1− (x⊕ α).
Hence
S(x, y)− s(x̃, y) = ((x⊕ α) + (y ⊕ β))− ((x̃⊕ α) + (y ⊕ β)) (mod 2n),
= (x⊕ α)− (2n − 1− (x⊕ α)) (mod 2n),
= 2(x⊕ α) + 1 (mod 2n).
Note that we have already computed the values S(x, y) and s(x̃, y) in Sec-
tion 4.5.2. Since 2 is not co-prime to the modulo 2n, there are exactly two
values of x⊕ α that satisfy the above equation: ∆ and ∆  2n−1. Hence the
lemma follows.
Algorithm 4 provides the pseudo code for solving HAP. The algorithm
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has trace complexity O(n) – requiring 2n + 2 calls to the (ideal) leakage
function.
Algorithm 4 Compute (α, β)
function (α, β) = GetAlphaBeta(void)
Pick arbitrary (x, y);
. Compute S(x, y) and s(x̃, y) by Algorithm 3
S0 = GetSum(x, y);
S1 = GetSum(x̃, y);
. Recover (α, β) using Lemma 3
a1 = ((S0− S1− 1) (mod 2n)) >> 1;
a2 = a1⊕ 2n−1;
b1 = y ⊕ ((S0− a1) mod 2n);
b2 = y ⊕ ((S0− a2) mod 2n);
return {(a1, b1), (a2, b2)};
end function
4.5.5 Progressing to Noisy Leakage
In a real world attack setting an adversary is unlikely to have noise free
leakages. We thus now consider how to translate the developed attack
strategy into a more realistic setting.
In principle, the reduction explained in Section 4.5.4 also holds for NHAP
to NHSP, as long as the adversary is able to recover S(x, y) given the noisy
leakage in NHSP. Further examining the HSP solution in Section 4.5.2, we see
that it is indeed sufficient to solve HSP given only the signs of the difference
∆HWi = HW (s
′
i)−HW (s), i ∈ [0, n− 1]. In the case of noisy leakages we
can reveal this difference by sampling the leakage function (i.e. the device)
multiple times on the same input. We thus get two sets of leakages:
S1 = {HW (s′i) + e},
S2 = {HW (s) + e}.
Clearly by subtracting the averages of these sets (i.e. conducting a classical
DPA-style attack), we can recover ∆HWi also in the noisy case. Moreover,
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Algorithm 5 Determine sign of ∆HW
function ∆HW = CompareHW (S1, S2)
(t, p) = test(S1, S2)
if p/2 ≥ SignificanceLevel then . Accept ∆HW = 0
return 0
else
if t > 0 then . +1 for positive ∆HW .
return +1





because we are only interested in the sign of ∆HWi, we can hope that in
practice we don’t require ‘large’ sets. To add a bit more rigour, we opted to
implement a standard two-tailed t-test in our experiments. A two-tailed test
can tell us if
• HW (s′i) = HW (s),
• HW (s′i) > HW (s), or
• HW (s′i) < HW (s).
Algorithm 5 outlines the pseudo code that determines the sign of ∆HW .
It first conducts a two-tailed test:
H0 : S1 = S2
H1 : S1 6= S2
using a set significance level, and interprets the result in terms of the sign of
∆HWi.
4.5.6 Word Extension
For some software implementations the registers in the processor could be
larger than the word length of the implemented cipher, e.g. it is easy to
83
CHAPTER 4. DPA ON ARX CIPHERS
imagine running a 16-bit SPARX on an ARM Cortex-M0 which has 32-bit
registers. In such a case Algorithm 1 may not recover the correct MSB of
S(x, y) as the carry bit corresponding to the MSB of S(x, y) will actually be
stored in the higher part of the register until it is used in a later computation.
There is a simple fix to this issue. We can simply treat the over-flow
carry bit as the MSB of the n+ 1 bit sum, then enumerate over its possible
values which are merely {0, 1}. Algorithm 3 needs to be updated accordingly
to initialise two possible s with different MSBs, and then call Algorithm 2 on
each one of them, although the same traces can be reused between two calls.
A side effect of the above fix is that an additional incorrect s will also
be returned by Algorithm 3. Enumerating them in Algorithm 4 eventually
results in 8 pairs of (α, β). To remove the invalid sub-keys, one can simply
re-run the attack multiple times starting with different choices of (x, y), then
take the intersection of (α, β) pairs returned by the attacks as the correct
sub-keys.
4.5.7 Compatible Power Leakage Models
As explained in Section 4.5.5, the attack does not exploit any actual value
of the leaked HW but only signs of the HW differences. Consequently, our
method can be applied to any power leakage model that is “monotonic” w.r.t.
the HW function. Additionally, for any other power leakage model that
“essentially” leaks S(x, y) and s(x̃, y) for arbitrary (x, y), one can trivially
recover the sub-keys (α, β) (cf. Section 4.5.4). For instance, the above class
includes those power leakage models that are monotonic w.r.t. the value of
the variable itself.
4.5.8 Requirement of Chosen Inputs
Recall from Section 4.5.4 that to recover (α, β), the adversary needs to know
the input (x, y) and the corresponding sums S(x, y) and s(x̃, y). For this,
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n+ 1 leakage function calls of a specific form are needed in order to recover
s(x, y). Similarly, to recover s(x̃, y) another n+ 1 specific leakage function
calls are required. Although such a requirement can be easily satisfied in
a chosen-message set up, in a setting where the adversary can only sample
random values, there seems to be no obvious way to get such leakage cheaply.
Therefore the attack in its current form would not be applicable given only
uniform randomly chosen pairs (x, y). Thus finding ways to deal with this
scenario makes an interesting topic for future work.
4.5.9 Experiments
The attack is mainly affected by three parameters in practice. These are the
noise distribution (characterised by σ), the number of repeat queries to the
leakage function, N , and the significance level of the two-tailed test. It is
well understood that these three quantities jointly determine how well a test
performs, and thus in turn, how often our attack succeeds. The success rate





Our set up is motivated by the SPARX [66] cipher which is designed
for 16-bit architectures (n = 16). Algorithm 5 is implemented using a t-
test. S1 and S2 are chosen to have the same sample size for simplicity. We
simulated the attack using different configurations where σ ∈ [0.1, 6] and
N ∈ [100, 1000]. Recall that N is the number of samples used for each tests.
A complete attack hence uses 2N(n+ 1) traces. It is well known that noisy
traces require more samples, and thus the results follow an expected and
natural trend.
However, the new strategy did not manage to recover the key on the real
traces. We suspect it might be caused by a leakage model incompatible with
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Figure 4.5: Simulation results for the attack. The left figure shows the success
rate as a function of the number of leakages (per query) when choosing a
significance of 0.01. The right figure is identical but for a significance of 0.05.
that described in Section 4.5.7.
4.6 CPA Against Rotation and XOR
We further extended our experiments to the more “difficult” targets in ARX-
Boxes described in [70], which are the linear operations XOR and rotation.
For a fair comparison with the experiments in Section 4.4 in terms of key
enumeration space, we selected the target intermediate to be the 8 lower-
order bits of (x⊕ α) of SPARX. Note that rotation has no effect in changing
the HW of the operand; hence XOR and rotation share the same predicted
of leakage in the HW model.
The correlation attack is again implemented with HW predictions and
applied on real traces collected with the same setup of the experiments
as in Section 4.4 (time axis shifted to XOR and rotate instructions). To
our surprise, the result seems contradict to those reported by [70] which
concluded that the addition is the most leaky instruction among those used
in ARX ciphers. The key was successfully recovered using only 500 traces
targeting the XOR as we show in Figure 4.6, which is much less than we
used for our failed attack against modular addition. Figure 4.4a shows the
(absolute values of) correlations over time. Three major local peaks are
observed, with the last two seemingly overlapped. The correct key 0x11 was
identified on the last peak (time 520) with the highest correlation of 0.408.
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The correct key has shows a clear distinguishing margin ahead of other key
candidates at point 520 where we present more detail in Figure 4.6b. The
symmetry in Figure 4.6b is due to the fact that:
HW (x̃⊕ α) = HW (x̃⊕ α) = n−HW (x⊕ α) (4.29)
where n = 8 is the size of the target intermediate in bits. Equation (4.29)
implies that complemented keys α and α̃) result in HW leakage predictions
complemented modulo n and thus the same absolute value of correlation.
We suspect the unexpected leakage in our results that is contrary to [70]
arises from a combination of the SPARX software implementation we show
in Figure 4.7, and a “signal amplification” effect deriving from the results of
[131].
The C code of Figure 4.7a is taken from the SPARX reference implement-
ation [128] and Figure 4.7b is the corresponding assembly compiled with
ARM toolchain arm-none-eabi 6.3.1. The ARM Cortex M0 was reportedly
known to predominantly leak the HW [131] and the assembly in Figure 4.7b
shows that consecutive instructions have involved the operands of XOR and
rotation, the HW of which are the same. These operands include:
1. r1 in L2,
2. Both r2 r1 in L2,
3. r1 as both input and output in L6,
4. Both r1 and r2 in L7, and
5. r1 as input in L10.
Recall [131] has reported on this processor that the leakage of each instruc-
tion can be well approximated by a linear combination of independent leakage
of operands in consecutive instructions; therefore if the same leakage, in this
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Evolution of correlations over time
Correct key (0x11)
(a) Evolution of correlations


















(b) Correlations of all Key candidates at point 520
Figure 4.6: Correlations of XOR and rotation using 500 real traces
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1 // Rotate l e f t f o r 16 b i t r e g i s t e r s .
2 #define ROTL(x , n) ( ( ( x )<<n) | ( ( x )>>(16−(n) ) ) )
3
4 stat ic void A( u i n t 1 6 t ∗ l , u i n t 1 6 t ∗ r )
5 {
6 (∗ l ) = ROTL((∗ l ) , 9) ;
7 (∗ l ) += (∗ r ) ;
8 (∗ r ) = ROTL((∗ r ) , 2) ;
9 (∗ r ) ˆ= (∗ l ) ;
10 }
11
12 stat ic void sparx encrypt ( u i n t 1 6 t ∗ x , u i n t 1 6 t k [ ] [ 2
∗ ROUNDS PER STEPS] )
13 {
14 . . .
15 //Key XOR.
16 x [ 2 ∗ b ] ˆ= k [N BRANCHES ∗ s + b ] [ 2 ∗ r ] ;
17 x [ 2 ∗ b + 1 ] ˆ= k [N BRANCHES ∗ s + b ] [ 2 ∗ r +
1 ] ;
18 // Rotat ion and Addit ion .
19 A( x + 2 ∗ b , x + 2 ∗ b + 1) ;
20 . . .
21 }
(a) SPARX ARX implemented in C
1 @Key XOR
2 eo r s r1 , r2
3
4 @Rotation
5 l s r s r2 , r1 , #7
6 l s l s r1 , r1 , #9
7 o r r s r1 , r2
8
9 @Modular add i t i on
10 adds r1 , r0 , r1
(b) SPARX ARX-Box implemented in ARM assembly
Figure 4.7: Implementation of 16 bit rotation on ARM-M0 (32 bit)
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case HW (x⊕α), has occurred multiple times in consecutive instructions, the
leakage will be accumulated for each instruction, resulting in an amplified
leakage, as suggested by our results in Figure 4.6. Therefore, even though
XOR and rotation instructions might independently be considered difficult
to attack according to [70], their leakage could still be easily exploited when
executed sequentially with the same operands in a careless implementation.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we performed a case study on the DPA properties of an
ARX-Box generalised from SPARX. We first showed that, although modular
addition is the only non-linear operation in ARX-Boxes, typical correlation
attacks would hardly succeed against this target by its nature in Section 4.4,
and proposed a novel chosen message DPA strategy in Section 4.5. On
the other hand, linear operations, i.e. XOR and rotation, despite being
difficult targets for DPA when taken independently, could be vulnerable in
combination when implemented inappropriately.
Although correlation attacks against modular addition have all failed
on the real traces in this chapter, our further research found that it is not
necessarily immune to DPA attacks. The non-injective property of modular
addition implies it is a natural target for generic distinguishers which are
free from errors introduced by inaccurate prediction model, as will be shown
later in Chapter 5 with a successful key recovery on the same real traces.
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A Novel Type of Generic
Distinguisher – Ordinal
5.1 Introduction
IoT devices are constantly evolving. New technologies are being applied to
the latest processors to improve their performance, reduce their size and,
most importantly for IoT, make them more energy efficient. These changes
have had a great impact on the SCA properties of new microcontrollers. As
pointed out by [132] and [131], other than the typical HW and HD models
which are widely observed on earlier embedded devices, such as 8 bit smart
cards described in [30], the latest processors are more frequently showing
distinctive leakage characters.
When it comes to attacking a device without knowledge of its leakage
behaviour, some DPA methods such as CPA are no longer appropriate as
their distinguishability heavily relies on the adversary correctly predicting
the leakage, which cannot be done without knowing the leakage model.
Alternatively, the adversary may turn to methods that require less knowledge
about the leakage model which typically include template attack [38] and
generic distinguisher [125]. Template attacks require the adversary to have
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full control over a device identical to the target to build a template for
the target through a profiling stage. In comparison, generic distinguishers
can be applied on arbitrary power models without relying on templates
which makes them beneficial when profiling is not possible. However, generic
distinguishers are also restricted in the sense that they can only be applied
on non-injective target functions, as described in [125].
In this chapter we begin by introducing some preliminaries of generic
distinguishers in Section 5.2. We then explain in Section 5.3 the characterist-
ics of the ordering of leakage, and how they could be exploited to construct
generic distinguishers in Section 5.4. In Section 5.5 and Section 5.6 we
demonstrate the experimental results of these generic distinguishers applied
on various target functions that can be commonly seen in lightweight ciphers
for IoT applications under different leakage models.
This chapter is based on my original, unpublished research jointly au-
thored with my colleague Arnab Roy and my supervisor Elisabeth Oswald.
In this work, I am responsible for proposing our new distinguishers and their
implementations as well as conducting all the experiments.
5.2 Preliminaries
5.2.1 Notations
In Chapter 5 we frequently uses vector variables which we denote in bold
font. For a function f : X → Y and a vector X ∈ Xn, f(X) denotes applying
f to each component of X locally.
For two sequences A and B,
A = (a1, a2, ..., an)
B = (b1, b2, ..., bm)
(5.1)
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A ⊂ B implies A is a subsequence of B, i.e. :
∃i, j,m ∈ Z : (ai, ai+1, ..., ai+m) = (bj , bj+1, ..., bj+m) (5.2)
We denote by v = Fk(x) the DPA target intermediate where k is the
embedded secret key in the target function F and x the known message to
the adversary. We denote by I and O the input and output space of F and
K the key space.
In an univariate DPA attack, we denote the traces collected by the
adversary as a set of the form T = {(x, t)}, where x is the input of the trace
and t the leakage value corresponding to x.
5.2.2 Generic Distinguishers
Generic distinguishers, formally defined in [133], are DPA strategies that
work without making any assumption about the device leakage. In brief,
unlike CPA explained in Chapter 2, which requires the adversary to predict
the hypothetical leakage with an assumed power model, generic distinguish-
ers exploit the equivalence classes induced by the key-hypothesised target
function Fk [133]; thus they work without the adversary predicting a power
model.
Due to their “assumption free” nature, generic distinguishers are spe-
cifically of interest in non-profiling scenarios against targets with unknown
leakage behaviour.Among the existing generic distinguishers, mutual inform-
ation (MI), and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) are the most popular choices









KS has been shown to be favourable over MI in certain cases because it it
does not require the explicit estimation of densities, but only the calculation
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of empirical cumulative distribution functions. Density estimation is a process
for which there is no optimal choice in general [134].
All these distinguisher definitions are set up such that the largest value
indicates the correct key guess.
5.2.3 The Bit Dropping Trick
One major restriction of generic distinguishers is that they require the target
function F to be non-injective, otherwise each key hypothesis would produce
partitions that are permutations of each other and cannot be distinguished,
as explained in [125]. Alternatively, it was pointed out in [135] that by
ignoring certain bits in the target intermediate v, one could effectively reduce
an injective Fk∗(x) into a non-injective function dropB(Fk∗(x)) where B
are the indexes of bits to be dropped. This technique is referred to “bit
dropping”.
Bit dropping has been proven practically effective in several cases and
has been studied in several places in the literatures of [135][136][133][137].
It was shown that the selection of B greatly impacts the performance of
the distinguishers to be applied later on and it is impossible to choose the
optimal B without having a priori knowledge of the device leakage function
MD.
5.3 Ordering of Leakage
In this section we explain the observations of the ordering of leakage which
our novel distinguishers will be based on in a noiseless setting. Like other
generic distinguishers, our distinguishers too require the target function to
be non-injective which implies |I| > |O|. We denote by mi the device leakage
corresponding to a target intermediate vi:
mi := MD(vi) (5.4)
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We define the ordered sequence M of mi:
M := (m1,m2, ...,m|O|−1,m|O|) (5.5)
such that p < q =⇒ mp ≤ mq, i.e. m1 ≤ m2 ≤ ... ≤ m|O|−1 ≤ m|O|.
Since |I| > |O|, there exists at least a pair of collision inputs (x1, x2)
such that:
∃x1, x2 ∈ I, x1 6= x2 : Fk∗(x1) = Fk∗(x2) (5.6)
Equation (5.6) in fact represents a collision of Fk∗ at two different inputs
(x1, x2). Extending it for all v ∈ O, we define the sets of inputs that collide
at a specific target intermediate v as collision set Cv:
Cv := {x : Fk∗(x) = v} (5.7)
For simplicity, we denote yi the device leakage corresponding to an input
xi:
yi := MD(Fk∗(xi)) (5.8)
Note that all inputs from the same collision set have the same device
leakage MD(v):
MD(v) = y1 = y2 = ... = ym−1 = ym (5.9)
for ∀x1, x2, ..., xm−1, xm ∈ Cv.
Define R the ordered sequence of yi for all inputs xi ∈ I:
R = (y1, y2, ..., y|I|−1, y|I|) (5.10)
such that p < q =⇒ yp ≤ yq, i.e. y1 ≤ y2 ≤ ...,≤ y|I|−1 ≤ y|I|.
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We define X the corresponding input sequence of R:
X := (x1, x2, ..., x|I|−1, x|I|) (5.11)
such that R = MD(Fk∗(X)). Specifically we have yi = MD(Fk∗(xi)) for all
1 ≤ i ≤ |I|. Note that without consideration of noise, obtaining R and X
does not require the knowledge of MD. Since the traces are given in the
form {(x, t)}, sorting them by t one immediately obtains R as the sequence
of t and X the sequence of x.
Recall from Equation (5.9) that all inputs in a collision set xi ∈ Cv have
the same device leakage yi = MD(v); thus their corresponding yi would
be in consecutive positions in R. Consequently, R is indeed M with each
component repeated |Cvi | times:
R = (y1, . . . , yi︸ ︷︷ ︸
={m1}|Cv1 |
, yi+1, . . . , yj︸ ︷︷ ︸
={m2}|Cv2 |





Note that for components of X in the same collision group xi ∈ Cv, it
holds that M−1D (yi) = Fk∗(xi) = v. Thus define V the target intermediate
sequence under the correct key k∗:
V = M−1D (R) = (v1, . . . , v1︸ ︷︷ ︸
|Cv1 |times
, v2, . . . , v2︸ ︷︷ ︸
|Cv2 |times




Although the values of {v1, v2, ..., v|O|} remain unknown without the
knowledge of key k∗ or the device leakage function MD, V has a distinctive
repetitive structure that could be exploited to recover the secret key k∗.
Therefore, during an attack, the adversary proceeds as follows:
1. Construct X from the trace set T .
2. For each key guess k, compute hypothetical intermediate sequence
Vk = Fk(X).
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In 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Out 11 15 3 2 10 12 9 1 6 7 8 0 14 5 13 4
Table 5.1: PRINCE S-Box
3. Test each Vk for the repetitive structure which must be held when
k = k∗.
Example 3. Take a noiseless example where the target intermediate v is
defined as the lowest 2 bits of the 16 bits PRINCE [138] S-Box output:
v = Fk(x) = SBoxPRINCE(x⊕ k) mod 22 (5.14)
where k, x ∈ Z24 and SBoxPRINCE is given in Table 5.1.
Suppose the device leaks the HW of v and the correct key k∗ = 5. Then,
for instance, given an input x = 1, its corresponding leakage value t is:
t = HW (F5((1))) = HW (2) = 1 (5.15)
thus the adversary is given a trace (x, t) = (1, 1).
During the attack, suppose the adversary has collected the following set
of traces:
T = {(x, t)} = {(0, 0), (1, 1), (2, 1), (3, 1), (4, 2), (5, 2), (6, 1), (7, 2),
(8, 1), (9, 1), (10, 0), (11, 1), (12, 2), (13, 1), (14, 0), (15, 0)}
with the first components being plaintext known to the adversary and the
second the corresponding leakage.
Sorting T by t gives:
Tsorted = ((0, 0), (10, 0), (14, 0), (15, 0), (1, 1), (6, 1), (9, 1), (13, 1),
(2, 1), (3, 1), (8, 1), (11, 1), (4, 2), (5, 2), (7, 2), (12, 2))
So the first and second components of Tsorted constitute X and R re-
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spectively:
X = (0, 10, 14, 15, 1, 6, 9, 13, 2, 3, 8, 11, 4, 5, 7, 12)
R = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2)
For each key guess k, the adversary computes Vk = Fk(X). For example,
if we substitute the correct key guess k = 5, we have:
V5 = F5(X) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 3, 3, 3) (5.16)
which holds the repetitive structure as demonstrated in Equation (5.13). In
contrast, substituting an incorrect key, say k = 0, we have:
V0 = F0(X) = (3, 0, 1, 0, 3, 1, 3, 1, 3, 2, 2, 0, 2, 0, 1, 2) (5.17)
which,unlike the case k = 5, does not hold the above mentioned repetitive
structure as for the case k = 5.
Note that, due to the fact that the HW function is non-injective, there
inevitably exist multiple target intermediates leaking exactly identical values
which are HW (v = 1) = HW (v = 2) = 1 in this case. As a result,
Tsordted would not be unique in this example and each one of them should
be considered valid in later computations. Nevertheless, we argue that the
practical impact of this issue is insignificant for the following reasons:
• We would be unlikely to observe multiple target intermediates having
strictly identical leakage on any real device.
• Its impact would tend to be negligible compared to noise in practice.
Compared to existing generic distinguishers such as MI and KS which
partition trace values based on predicted intermediate values, our observation
of the ordering of leakage inspires an inverted approach that partitions
predicted intermediate values based on the measured traces. For this idea
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to work, we need to be able to define an ordering relationship on the traces,
hence the name ordinal. We explain in detail how the above observation
could be instantiated as distinguishers in Section 5.4.
5.4 Ordering-based Distinguishers
In Section 5.3 we explained the properties of the ordering of leakage which
leads to the repetitive structure of V. In this section, we develop two
distinguishers, namely Ordinal-Entropy in Section 5.4.1 and Ordinal-Variance-
of-Positions (Ordinal-VP) in Section 5.4.2, both inspired by this observation.
In principle, the major difference between the correct key and other
incorrect keys lies in whether the distinctive repetitive structure holds for
their corresponding hypothetical intermediate sequence Vk, the computation
of which is a common set up when implementing an ordinal distinguisher.
Similar to the noiseless case explained in Section 5.3, the adversary constructs
an approximation of R, denote as R̂, by sorting the noisy traces T̂ = {x, t̂}
by their leakage values t̂:
R̂ = (t̂1, t̂2, ..., t̂N−1, t̂N ) (5.18)
where p < q =⇒ t̂p ≤ t̂q, i.e. t̂1 ≤ t̂2 ≤ ... ≤ t̂N−1 ≤ t̂N .
And the approximation of X, denote as X̂, immediately follows by
mapping t̂ in R̂ to their associated x in T̂ :
X̂ = (x1, x2, ..., xN−1, xN ) (5.19)
where (xi, t̂i) ∈ T̂ for i ∈ Z+N .
To recover the key, the adversary makes a key guess k for every k ∈ K
and computes the hypothetical intermediate sequence corresponding to key
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guess k, denote as Vk:
Vk = Fk(X̂) (5.20)
Under the correct key guess, i.e. k = k∗, the adversary would ideally
expect Vk = V and thus the repetitive structure can be observed in Vk.
However, such precise equality is unlikely to hold for noisy real traces; there-
fore in principle, the distinguishing scores of ordinal distinguishers can be
viewed intuitively as the likelihood of the existence of such repetitive struc-
tures in Vk for a key guess k. The more likely Vk possess such repetitively
structure, the more likely k = k∗ and vice versa. Following this principle, we
propose two ordinal distinguishers in this section and experimentally prove
their effectiveness against different target functions later in Section 5.5 and
Section 5.6.
5.4.1 Ordinal-Entropy
Observe Equation (5.13) that takes an arbitrary subsequence v ⊂ V, the
subsequence v preserves the repetitive structure. Denote V the multiset of
v:
V = {v : v ∈ v} (5.21)
Since most components are repetitive in v, V is thus expected to have a
relatively low entropy. Based on this observation, for a key guess k, we take
a subsequence vk ⊂ Vk and define its corresponding multiset Vkk. We define
the sub distinguishing score for Vk as the negative of the entropy of Vk:
dvk = −H(Vk) =
|Vk|∑
i=1
pi log2 pi (5.22)
where pi is the frequency of a target intermediate vi ∈ Vk. The negative sign
is added so that higher scores indicate greater likelihood, consistent with
other existing distinguishers.
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Note that dvk can be computed for arbitrary vk ⊂ Vk and the selection
of vk is trivial. The following factors should be noticed in the selection of vk:
• Due to the mathematical property of Shannon’s entropy, for arbitrary
vk, dvk has a strict lower bound which is −H(O). On the other hand,
increasing the length of vk implies more v to be added into Vk which
effectively reduces the upper bound of dvk . As a result, the range of
dvk is reduced, resulting in a smaller distinguishing margin between
the correct key and the others.
• Rearranging the elements in vk has no impact on Vk, nor thus on
dvk . This means errors within the selected vk will be neglected when
computing dvk . Therefore a larger size of vk implies more tolerance to
noise but at the same time reduces the distinguishing margin between
the correct key and the others and vice versa.
The problem of selecting the optimal vk remains open at this stage of
our work. Without loss of generality, here we propose a robust strategy by
selecting two halves of Vk, denoting the lower half v
L
k and higher half v
H
k ,
respectively. The corresponding multisets are therefore:
VLk = {vi : vi ∈ Vk, 1 ≤ i ≤ |N |/2}
VHk = {vi : vi ∈ Vk, |N |/2 + 1 ≤ i ≤ |N |}
(5.23)
where vi denotes the i-th component of Vk.
We then compute their sub distinguishing scores respectively as:
dLk = −H(VLk )
dHk = −H(VHk )
(5.24)
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Figure 5.1: Implementation of Ordinal Distinguisher
where the higher Dk, the more likely k = k
∗.
Referring to Example 3, for the correct key guess k = 5, from Equa-
tion (5.16) we have:
VL5 = {0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 2, 2}
VH5 = {1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 3, 3, 3}
(5.26)
Hence
dL5 = −H(VL5 ) = −1







5 = −2 (5.28)
By comparison, for k = 0, we have D0 = −3.331 < −2 = D5 which
suggests that k = 5 is more likely to be the correct key than k = 0.
Figure 5.1 summarises the implementation of Ordinal-Entropy. An equi-
valent pseudocode that returns the best key guess kG is also provided in
Algorithm 6.
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Algorithm 6 Entropy based Ordinal Distinguisher
function Ordinal H(T = {(x, t)})
R̂ = (t1, t2, ..., tN−1, tN ) := Sort({t : (x, t) ∈ T }), where p < q =⇒
tp ≤ tq;
X̂ := (x1, x2, ..., xN−1, xN ) where (xi, ti) ∈ T for 1 ≤ i ≤ N .







+1, ..., xN )
for k ∈ K do
VLk := {v : v ∈ Fk(X̂L)}
VHk := {v : v ∈ Fk(X̂H)}
Dk = −H(VLk )−H(VHk )
end for
return kG where DkG = max({Dk})
end function
5.4.2 Ordinal-Variance-of-Positions
Another observation regarding the repetitive structure in Equation (5.13) is
that the same target intermediates are “clustered”, i.e. they are positioned
next to each other in Equation (5.13). The second distinguisher is thus based
on the idea of detecting the repetitive structure by testing the dispersion
of positions of each target intermediate within each Vk. To this end, we
introduce the position function PosVk(v) that returns the set of positions
(starting from 1) of target intermediate v in Vk:
PosVk(v) = {i|the i-th component of Vk = v} (5.29)
The dispersion of PosVk(v) is then quantified by the variance of PosVk(v),
denoted as V ar(PosVk(v)).
Observe that, due to the repetitive structure of V, for any v ∈ V, PosV(v)
returns the set constituting of |Cv| consecutive natural numbers:
PosV (v) = {z, z + 1, z + 2, ..., z + |Cv| − 1} (5.30)
where z is the position of the first appearance of v in V.
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Hence:
V ar(PosV(v)) = (|Cvi |2 − 1)/12 (5.31)
for any v ∈ V. Due to the fact that positions are unique natural numbers,
it is provable that V ar(PosV(v)) is also the lower bound of V ar(PosVk(v))
for arbitrary Vk and v:









Equation (5.33) implies that
∑v∈O
v V ar(PosVk(v)) reaches its minimum
when k = k∗. We thus exploit this property and define the distinguishing





where the negative sign is added so that higher scores indicate greater
likelihood, consistent with existing distinguishers.
Referring to Example 3, from Equation (5.16) we have:
PosV5(0) = {1, 2, 3, 4}
PosV5(1) = {9, 10, 11, 12}
PosV5(2) = {5, 6, 7, 8}





V ar(PosV5(v)) = −6.667
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which indeed is the lower bound confirmed by Equation (5.33).
By comparison, when k = 0, from Equation (5.17) we have:
PosV0(0) = {2, 4, 12, 14}
PosV0(1) = {3, 6, 8, 15}
PosV0(2) = {10, 11, 13, 16}
PosV0(3) = {1, 5, 7, 9}
Thus D0 = −79.333 < −0.667 = D5. Therefore we conclude that 5 is more
likely to be the correct key.
Compared with Ordinal-Entropy, we consider Ordinal-VP more robust as
it circumvents the issue of selecting v. We show its corresponding pseudocode
in Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7 Ordinal-VP
function Ordinal VP(T = {(x, t)})
R̂ = (t1, t2, ..., tN−1, tN ) := Sort({t : (x, t) ∈ T }), where p < q =⇒
tp ≤ tq;
X̂ := (x1, x2, ..., xN−1, xN ) where (xi, ti) ∈ T for 1 ≤ i ≤ N .






return kG where DkG = max({Dk})
end function
5.5 Real Trace Experiments
The real trace experiments are performed on the SCALE board described
in Section 2.4. We selected two typical target functions for our experiments
which are the modular addition in the unprotected SPARX C reference
implementation and the S-Box output in an AES implementation based
on AES Furious [139]. Even though the modular addition in SPARX is
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non-injective by nature, we reduced our target to the 4 LSB of the modular
sum in Figure 4.1a for a practical enumeration space. For the AES S-Box
we used the 4 LSB, i.e.we dropped the 4 MSB as explained in Section 5.2.3,
for a balanced number of partition (or intermediate) and traces in each
partitions (or intermediates). We compared our distinguishers to the popular
ones in the literatures which are Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) and Mutual
Information with identity and HW models (MI-ID and MI-HW). The success
rates in our experiments are evaluated from 1000 repeated experiments. We
additionally tested single bit DPA against the LSB of S-Box output in the
AES experiments.
Figure 5.2a and Figure 5.2b show the results of our real trace experiments.
The success rates of all distinguishers have eventually converged to one except
for single bit DPA in the AES experiments. We also noticed that the SPARX
modular addition is a relatively more difficult target than AES S-Box in
our experiments in terms of required number of traces to achieve the same
success rate. Both ordinal distinguishers we described in Section 5.4 have
shown to be effective in both experiments. Ordinal-VP turns out to be the
most trace efficient distinguisher, with a clear margin ahead of the others in
both experiments. In contrast, MI-ID had the worst performance among all
generic distinguishers and only outperformed single bit DPA for at least 1000
traces in the AES experiment. MI-HW and KS are generally the second best
distinguishers respectively, with Ordinal-Entropy being third in both cases.
5.6 Simulations
In this section we repeat same experiments of Section 5.5 on simulated traces,
to demonstrate the performance of these distinguishers under different leakage
models and SNR.
Four leakage models are considered in our simulations. The first two
represent typical leakage models commonly seen on real devices:
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(a) SPARX modular addition (b) AES S-Box
Figure 5.2: Generic distinguishers (and single bit DPA) on SCALE traces
HW Leakage defined as the HW of the target intermediate. The HW
model has been widely used to predict hypothetical leakage values in
correlation attacks. It is also a typical form of real leakage.
Randomly weighted bits This model assumes that each bit independently
leaks its HW weighted by a constant coefficient randomly chosen from
[−1, 1]. This type of leakage has been reported on some ARM processors
[131].
The other two are theoretic leakage models representing some extreme
cases:
Binary The leakage is defined as the XOR of all bits of the target inter-
mediate. This leakage model represents the case where the entropy of
leakage is minimum1.
Strongly non-linear The leakage function is defined as an S-Box trans-
formation of target intermediate v:
MD(v) = SBox(v)
This model represents the case where the leakage depends on every
1Assuming leakage values are uniformly distributed over their range.
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bit of v. The S-Boxes are instantiated as those of PRESENT[140] and
AES[17] for 4 and 8 bit target intermediates respectively.
For each leakage model, we generated traces with SNR ∈ {2−8, 2−5, 2−3, 20, 21}.
We noticed that all distinguishers failed to recover the key in the AES
simulations using the binary and the strongly non-linear models. We consider
that this was due to the drawback of the bit dropping trick: the trick
inherently assumes the leakage contributed by the dropped bits can be
treated as part of the noise in the bit dropped target function, which does
not hold in the above scenarios. All distinguishers were shown successful
in all the other scenarios. Similar to the results on real traces, Ordinal-VP
seemed to be the most trace efficient one among all successful experiments,
outperforming the others with a clear margin.
Similar to the No Free Lunch theorem [141] in case of machine learning,
there exist no optimal generic distinguisher in general: the performance of
a distinguisher is determined by a combination of factors including device
leakage behaviour, SNR and the structure of target function as explained
in [125]. Specifically, for generic distinguishes that requires estimating the
leakage distribution, e.g. MI, it is proved in [134] that there exists no optimal
estimator in general. Further more, for MI and KS to achieve their best
performance, the adversary should provide a “good” prediction model to
the distinguisher [135] [142]. This indeed contradicts with the premise of a
non-profiling attack scenario, as such prediction model cannot be obtained
without a profiling stage. In comparison, the fact that Ordinal-VP turned
out to be best distinguisher in our representative experiments suggests that
Ordinal-VP could arguably be a more robust method than MI and KS as it
strips the errors that would be induced by distribution estimation and the
inaccuracy of prediction model.
Specifically, it is an intriguing fact that Ordinal-VP outperform MI
even the later is provided an accurate power model of HW (Figure 5.3 and
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Figure 5.3: Generic distinguishers on SPARX modular addition traces simu-
lated by HW
Figure 5.7). This raises an open question to the conclusion drawn in a recent
work [143] where the authors proved the asymptotic optimality of MI under
certain circumstances: could there be any factor that has been overlooked in
transforming the theoretical results into practice?
5.6.1 Non-uniform Target Intermediate
We additionally performed a group of simulations against a target function
that is altered from SPARX ARX-Box, named XOR-then-multiply, where
the target intermediate v is defined as:
v = (x⊕ α) ∗ (y ⊕ β) mod 2n (5.35)
where (α, β) are the keys, (x, y) the inputs and n the operand size.
We consider XOR-then-multiply an interesting target on account of the
following properties:
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Figure 5.4: Generic distinguishers on SPARX modular addition traces simu-











































































































Figure 5.5: Generic distinguishers on SPARX modular addition traces simu-
lated by binary leakage
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Figure 5.6: Generic distinguishers on SPARX modular addition traces simu-












































































































Figure 5.7: Generic distinguishers using 4 LSB and single bit DPA using
LSB on AES S-Box traces simulated by HW leakage
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Figure 5.8: Generic distinguishers using 4 LSB and single bit DPA using
LSB on AES S-Box traces simulated by randomly weighted bits leakage
• Unlike the SPARX and AES experiments, the output of XOR-then-
multiply is not uniformly distributed over its range.
• It holds that the distribution of v is independent of the keys (α, β).
The generic distinguishers were applied in their original forms without
any modification. All distinguishers failed against the binary leakage model,
and Figure 5.9 to Figure 5.11 show the success rates in other scenarios. KS
emerged as the most effective distinguisher in these experiments, especially
in the low SNR setups. We suppose this is due to the fact that the definition
of th KS distinguisher inherently normalised the sub scores for each partition
and thus the fact that v is not uniform over O has been taken into account.
As the SNR was increased, all other distinguishers started to recover, with
Ordinal-VP raised to the second best distinguisher after KS.
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Figure 5.10: Generic distinguishers on XOR-then-multiply traces simulated
by randomly weighted bits leakage
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Figure 5.11: Generic distinguishers on XOR-then-multiply traces simulated
by strongly non-linear (PRESENT S-Box) leakage
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed the idea of constructing generic distinguishers
exploiting the ordering of leakage. We further instantiated two distinguishers
based on this idea, namely Ordinal-Entropy and Ordinal-VP. We then tested
the distinguishers on two target functions in SPARX and AES, and showed
that Ordinal-VP experimentally has the best trace efficiency using both real
and simulated traces. However, when applied to the target function XOR-
then-multiply, where the target intermediate is not uniformly distributed





Connectivity finds the greatest revolution in IoT devices which distinguishes
them from general embedded devices. In IoT applications, devices are
no longer stand-alone: they cooperate with each other within a network
which eventually connects to the Internet. Whereas the typical TCP/IP
network stack produces significant overhead to achieve quality of service for
applications that are based on it, the nature of many IoT “things” is such that
a full implementation of the protocols would not be practical. Often ‘things’
are sensors, which are devices that have to function on little resources (most
importantly power). Thus a whole host of new networking protocols have
been developed over the years to cater for such resource constrained devices:
6LoWPAN is the ‘tiny’ version of IPv6, UDP tends to be used instead of
TCP, DTLS can be used for end-to-end security (or one can directly invoke
802.15.4 security which is part of 6LoWPAN), and finally CoAP(s) is the
replacement for HTTP(s). Thus there are two options (802.15.4, and DTLS)
to secure communications between the ‘things’ and a server/gateway.
Securing IoT applications is a difficult task. In addition to the side channel
attacks that have been well understood as severe security threats against
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embedded devices [30], many other attacks use protocol level information
(such as packet lengths, types of packets or protocol messages) to recover
information about plaintexts, devices in the network, or the network itself.
There exists a considerable body of work in the context of conventional, i.e.
HTTPs over TCP/IP network, but not much literature we have found with
respect to the security implication of these attacks for 6LoWPAN. This is the
gap that we address with this work. We stipulate that most of these attacks
may still be applicable, as we intend to demonstrate in this chapter. As of
writing the thesis, this is so far the first work that explores the feasibility of
traffic analysis techniques over 6LoWPAN networks to our knowledge.
This chapter is structured as follows: after reviewing some relevant attack
paths for HTTPs over TCP/IP in the following subsection, we provide a brief
introduction to the necessary protocol and network features in Section 6.2.1.
We discuss the impact of packet length leakage in Section 6.3, followed by
an analysis of the response time leakage in Section 6.4. We summarise our
work in Section 6.5. This work was done in conjunction with E. Oswald and
T. Tryfonas. It has been published in:
Yan Yan, Elisabeth Oswald and Theo Tryfonas. ‘Exploring Potential
6LoWPAN Traffic Side Channels’. In: Proceedings of the 2018 International
Conference on Embedded Wireless Systems and Networks. EWSN &#8217;18.
Madrid, Spain: Junction Publishing, 2018, pp. 270–275. isbn: 978-0-9949886-
2-1. url: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3234847.3234911[9]
As the main author I was responsible for all main aspects of the work.
This includes investigating the related protocol standardisation documents
together with their implementations in Contiki OS[13]. I was also responsible
for proposing the novel idea of an application fingerprinting attack as well as
conducting all the experiments in this work.
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6.2 Preliminaries
6.2.1 A Typical IoT Protocol Stack
There are large number of protocols which have been proposed for different
IoT applications adapting to various requirements. For example, some
smart houses simply use WiFi for connectivity, and VANETs1 may adopt
DSRC[144].
In this chapter we focus on 6LoWPAN[22] which is based on the 802.15.4[16]
standard. These standards are designated for constrained environments such
as Wireless Sensor Networks, but other competing standards exist at different
layers. Bluetooth Low Energy(BLE)[145] is a strong competitor to 802.15.4
as well as the LiFi[146] technology. Zigbee[21] was originally intended as
a collective protocol over 802.15.4 but it has been recently adapted to an
IP-based network in ZigbeeIP[147]. The RIME stack[148] proposes a set of
non-layered primitives over 802.15.4 but it is likely to be phased-out due to
the lack of of interoperability with the TCP/IP protocol stack.
6LoWPAN thus is the most popular standard for low power networks, and
thus it is supported by several competing IoT Operating Systems, including
Contiki OS[13], OpenWSN[24], FreeRTOS[149] and the recent RIOT[150].
We chose Contiki OS for our experiments because it is easy to customise.
With regard to the aspect of protocol design, the recent paper [151]
summarised some known flaws of 6LoWPAN, including its susceptibility to the
Fragmentation Attack[152], Sinkhole Attack[153], Hello Flood Attack[154],
Wormhole Attack[155] and Blackhole Attack[156]. In addition, [157] reported
certain problematic designs in 802.15.4 security[16]. However we do not
discuss further these particular design flaws as they touch on a different
aspect of the security issues in 6LoWPAN compared to what we address in
this chapter.
1Vehicular ad hoc networks
117








Application CoAP / CoAPs*
Table 6.1: Protocol stack for our experiments (* are optinal)
6.2.2 Our Experimental Network
Our experimental network is constructed using two different devices; a
TelosB[15] and a CC2538[14]. The TelosB is a low cost sensor powered by
an MSP430 with an AES co-processor. It represents typical low-end devices.
The CC2538 is the high end device powered by an ARM Cortex-M3 with
multiple cryptographic processors including AES, RSA, SHA-2 and ECC,
suggesting that it is suitable to develop secure applications.
Both devices are supported by the Contiki OS. We adopted the default
settings of the Contiki OS, except for enabling 802.15.4 security[16] for
some experiments. Note that the Contiki MAC[158] is chosen by default
over TSCH[159]. For Layer 4[160] and above protocols, we went with the
widely accepted combination of CoAP[161], and DTLS[162](optional) over
UDP[163]2. Table 6.1 summarises our choice of protocol stack.
802.15.4 and DTLS
In our setting, there are two standards available for packet encryption:
802.15.4 security[16] and DTLS[162]. 802.15.4 security is provided by the
noncoresec[164] API, which implements 802.15.4 authenticated encryption
with AES-128 CCM*[165] using a hard-coded key shared by the whole
6LoWPAN network. We chose tinyDTLS[166] as library for the DTLS pro-
tocols, because it provides a minimum DTLS implementation that supports
two ciphersuites which are TLS PSK WITH AES 128 CCM 8[167] and
2CoAPs is equivalent to CoAP over DTLS.
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TLS ECDHE ECDSA WITH AES 128 CCM 8[167] respectively. Evidently,
they both utilise AES-128 CCM* as the packet encryption method.
6.3 Exploiting Packet Length Information
As our brief survey of traffic analysis via exploiting packet lengths showed
in Section 6.2, the packet length has proven to be a powerful side channel
for the classical Internet protocols. It is worth noting that this side channel
is ‘noisy’ in the classical Internet setting; websites or web applications in
this setting typically feature advertisements, which impact on packet lengths;
TCP/IP allows to fragment packets and then reassembles them, a feature
which is not presented in UDP. Thus, due to the nature of UDP, exploiting
the packet length as a side channel should be easier in the IoT setting.
Clearly then, any web-application-style implementations involving an IoT
device will be extremely vulnerable to attacks such as [32]. In the absence of
this scenario for state-of-the art IoT applications, it still sends a cautionary
warning to developers; binary responses (e.g. ‘yes’ vs. ‘no’, or ‘on’ vs. ‘off’)
must always be coded via a binary variable and not via strings because these
will have different lengths, which are directly visible via the packet length.
In the remainder of this section we highlight further problems that arise
if packet lengths leak information.
6.3.1 Distinguishing ICMP Messages
The Internet Control Message Protocol(ICMP)[168] performs the manage-
ment tasks in a network, such as link establishment and routing information
exchange. As explained before, we utilise the open source system Contiki,
which supports a (sub)set of the ICMP standard (we list the supported
ICMP messages further below). Many ICMP messages are ideal for net-
work discovery and exploration, although the purpose of ICMP is to send
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error messages to the source IP address if standard IP packets fail to be
transmitted correctly.
• DAG Information Object (DIO)
DIO contains the 6LoWPAN global information. It could be periodically
broadcasted for network maintenance, or unicasted to a new joining
node as a reply to DIS (see below).
• DAG Information Solicitation (DIS)
DIS is sent by a newly started node to probe any existing 6LoWPANs.
A DIO would be replied if the DIS is received by any neighbour nodes.
• Destination Advertisement Object (DAO)
DAO is sent by a child node to its precedents (The 6LoWPAN DODAG
topology is defined in [169]) to propagate its routing information.
• Neighbour Solicitation (NS) and Neighbour Advertisement
(NA)
NS and NA are the ARP replacement in IPv6, where NS queries a
translation and NA answers one. In addition, they are also used for
local link validity checks.
• Echo Request and Echo Response (PING)
Echo Request and Echo Response are well known as the PING packets.
They are mostly used for diagnostic purposes, such as connectivity
test or Round Trip Time (RTT) estimation. Echo Request may con-
tain arbitrary user defined data and Echo Response simply echoes its
corresponding request.
Generally, ICMP messages can be protected by either using the secure
ICMP messages as described in [168], or relying on the lower layer encryption
provided by 802.15.4. Contiki OS does not have the former implemen-
ted, hence 802.15.4 security is currently the only option. We simulated a
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PING 101 + x unicast
UDP Multicast 85 + x broadcast
UDP Unicast 107 + x unicast
Table 6.2: 6LoWPAN packet features
6LoWPAN network with 802.15.4 security enabled (with strongest encryp-
tion and authentication). We configured the nodes to also generate random
UDP packets. Despite the fact that all ICMP messages were encrypted, our
experiments show that several ICMP messages can be identified by their
packet size and MAC destination. Table 6.2 summarises the packet features.
The value x denotes the size of user defined data in bytes.
Among the unicast packets, PING and UDP have at least 101 and 108
bytes3. Therefore, DAO can be uniquely identified as the shorter unicast
packet of 97 bytes. For the same reason NA and unicast NS can also be
distinguished from other packets by filtering packets of 87 bytes. Considering
that NA is sent as a response to NS according to the protocol, one can always
identify the first being NS and second being NA.
Similarly, unicast DIO can be identified as the 123 bytes packet followed
by DIS, where the latter has a unique 85 byte size. However, there is a
potential of false positive induced by PING or UDP packets with user defined
data crafted to have the same packet length4. PING could be recognised by
its pair-wised appearance, as the response would have nearly the same meta
data as the original request, except the exchanged source and destination.
For broadcast packets, DIS can be easily identified by its unique 85 bytes
3PING can be sent without user defined data and UDP packets requires at least 1 byte.
422 bytes for PING and 16 bytes for UDP.
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packet size. Others like broadcast NS can be identified by the followed
characteristic NA response; and packets of 118 bytes that are periodically
broadcasted are likely to be DIOs.
In summary, among all the packets, DAO, NA, NS, DIS can be identified
with certainty. DIO and PING cannot be identified with certainty but
they both have significant characters. Notice that the above contained all
ICMPv6 messages supported by Contiki; therefore UDP packets can be
reversely filtered, although in some cases they get mixed with DIO and
PING.
Although leakage in ICMP messages does not directly lead to any breach
of application data, it would still be harmful by providing the adversary with
information about the state of the network, including which nodes recently
joined etc. Specifically DAO is always sent from a child to its parent and can
be uniquely identified; therefore together with MAC addresses the adversary
may exploit it to draw a graph that shows the parental relations in the
network. In addition, this information can also be exploited by attacks as in
[170].
6.3.2 Distinguishing Different Devices
In the classical Internet world, ICMP has been well known for its use for
OS fingerprinting[171]. In the case of the IoT, this could be possible as well
(as different OS support different subsets of ICMP), however an additional
attack vector exists. This is because different IoT devices have different
hardware limitations or drivers. We noticed that our TelosB[15] discards
all packets exceeding 127 bytes5 whereas our CC2538 handles packets even
up to 160 bytes. Therefore an adversary can immediately rule out TelosB
whenever a packet larger than 127 bytes processed by the target.
5MTU specified by 802.15.4 standard.
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6.4 Exploiting Response Time Information
The response time is another major feature that has been previously exploited
in Internet traffic analysis attacks. Like in the case of exploiting packet
lengths, we would expect that the same attacks (as in the classical Internet
setting) can be applied to 6LoWPAN traffic. Indeed, like in the previous
section, we would expect that they will work even better because the accuracy
of timing measurements can be greatly improved for 6LoWPAN traffic as
there are fewer noise sources in the traffic. Since the devices are physically
close to each other and uses RF to communicate, the adversary can remove
the RTT noises by measuring the packets on the server side. Also the
constrained performance of the devices also gives a better resolution of the
execution time.
6.4.1 Distinguishing Different Sensors
The first application of timing analysis that we describe is to distinguish
between different sensors that are accessed on a device. For this purpose we
set up an experiment on a classic device , namely CC2538, that has three
on-board sensors: Vdd, temperature, and an Ambient Light Sensor (short
ALS). We access these via CoAP[161], a protocol designed for constrained
devices that provides an universal interface for accessing resources. CoAPs
is the secure version which stands for CoAP with DTLS.
Due to the different physical characteristics of the sensors, there could
be a variance of time that is required for reading the measurements. We
investigated whether such variances could be observed through the packet
response latency. If this was the case, then an adversary could learn the
nature/purpose of sensors on a network by observing their response time.
We thus set up an experiment on CC2538, using all three sensors from
“cc2538-demo”. We used CoAP from the “er-rest-example” in the Contiki OS
source code, as there is no CoAPs implementation available. Although DTLS
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Average (ms) Range(ms)
Vdd 9.622 [9.388, 10.318]
Temperature 9.835 [9.525, 10.318]
ALS 11.651 [11.338, 12.031]
Table 6.3: CoAP response latency for sensor readings on CC2538
processing would definitely have an impact on the response latency, we argue
that such impact would be independent to the sensors being accessed; hence
similar result can be equally expected for CoAPs. We carefully controlled
other factors, including URIs, data representation and code flow, to be
uniform for all three sensors in order to guarantee a controlled environment.
Table 6.3 summarises the result. It shows that ALS takes about 2ms
longer and hence can be easily distinguished. Vdd and temperature have
stronger overlapping distributions, and thus are more difficult to distinguish.
Nevertheless, these results confirm our hypothesis: different sensors have
different latencies and these leak through the response time. An adversary
whom is interested in finding out information about devices on a network
might thus be able to match the (known) behaviour of ‘interesting’ sensors
to what they observe on the network. We remark that this could be useful
even in the setting where the sensors transmit their data unencrypted; after
all they might return only some reading without a unit of measurement; thus
seeing their return data might not as such reveal their nature.
6.4.2 Distinguishing Different Devices
As we observed before, different devices have different underlying hardware
and thus different computational power. This implies that there could be
the potential that different devices take different amounts of time to process
the same message. Because ICMP messages are standardised, they are
particularly suitable for this purpose. Among the different ICMP messages,
PING is especially ideal for two reasons:
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CC2538 TelosB
Average(ms) 9.56 17.03
Range(ms) [9.16, 10.06] [16.49, 17.68]
Table 6.4: PING response latency
1. It is mandatory in the ICMP standard.
2. It only swaps the source and destination address of the packet; thus
minimises different code path in protocol processing.
Table 6.4 shows the PING response latency on CC2538 and TelosB. The
result confirms that these devices can be distinguished by PING response
latency.
6.4.3 Distinguishing Programs
We remarked before that the functionality of a sensor is potentially valuable
information. For instance some sensors might be predominantly passive, e.g.
they might read the temperature and report it back periodically, whereas
some sensors might control something upon receiving commands. Thus,
knowing the functionality enables an adversary to make (more) sense of the
observed traffic in the network. This could be done if a ‘fingerprint’ could be
produced for different programs. From an adversary’s perspective a positive
result would imply that they could ‘fingerprint’ products which are on the
market and thus use this information to infer what program is running on a
target device.
To illustrate why this might work, we now look at Figure 6.1. It illustrates
two sensors receiving the same service request. In our example, at the
time of receiving the request, Sensor Node 1 was idle and hence responded
immediately, whilst Sensor Node 2 postponed the request for reading a sensor.
Clearly, the response time on Sensor Node 2 would appear longer than that
of Sensor Node 1.
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Figure 6.1: Variations in response time
In real life, most sensors are programmed in a loop; therefore the same
code fragments are repeated through the life time of a sensor. Each code
fragment takes a different mount of time to execute and hence the response
times vary. This behaviour could be statistically analysed and the resulting
distribution could be stored as a ‘fingerprint’ .
For this fingerprinting scenario, we must assume the adversary has the pre-
knowledge of potential programs and can fingerprint them (or that they have
access to a database that contains this information). To identify an unknown
program running on target sensor, the adversary collects a new fingerprint
and then matches it to available fingerprints. Clearly, to effectively launch
the attack, the adversary needs to be able to send the request to a targeted
sensor (requests with short predictable processing time are preferable as they
induce less noise).
In practice, the request can be instantiated by several messages defined in
the sensor network protocols. PING is exceptionally ideal as it is mandatory
in the ICMP standard[172] and has only negligible computation. Other
options are Heartbeat in DTLS[173], Reset in CoAP[161], etc.
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Figure 6.2: Example PRI
Extracting Fingerprints
We explored the feasibility of fingerprinting programs on an CC2538 running
Contiki OS by using the PING command.
Figure 6.2 shows an example of captured packets. Contiki MAC[158]
sends duplicated PING requests. The response time, which refers to PING
Response Interval, PRI, is defined to be the time between a PING response
and its last paired request. The highlighted Packets 205 and 203 shows such
an example.
Figure 6.3a shows the histogram of PRIs collected on the “helloworld”
example from Contiki OS. Values ≥12ms are collected at 12ms. The result
shows that most PRIs are clustered around 9.5ms which consists with our
result in Table 6.4. The majority, roughly ranged [9.0, 10.3]ms, corresponds
to the usual response time as depicted by Sensor Node 1 in Figure 6.1.
We further plotted the upper outliers, mostly ranged [12, 2000]ms, in
Figure 6.3b. Although we were not be to able to identify the exact cause of
such delay, we suppose these outliers correspond to the extended response
time as depicted by Sensor Node 2 in Figure 6.1. The distribution described
by Figure 6.3b is the fingerprint of the “helloworld” example.
The result in Figure 6.3 shows a clear gap between the usual PRIs and
extended PRIs. In fact, experimented applications showed the same property.
This implies that an adversary can easily draw a threshold by observing the
whole PRI distribution and then filter out the fingerprint. In our experiments
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(a) PRIs of helloworld
(b) PRIs outliers of helloworld
Figure 6.3: helloworld PRIs
128
CHAPTER 6. EXPLOITING PACKAGE FEATURE
the threshold was set to 12ms but any other values within the gap would
also work.
We collected the fingerprints for three programs taken from the Contiki
OS examples:
broadcast This program periodically broadcasts a constant message.
powertrace This program records the power consumption and broadcasts
a constant message.
Sensorpayload This program is based on the “er-rest-example” embedded
together with sensor accesses taken from “cc2538-demo”. It captures a
real case scenario where three different sensors, namely Temperature,
Vdd and ALS, are being accessed through CoAP.
Specifically for “Sensorpayload” we collected fingerprints for 8 different
scenarios where different sensors are being accessed. For each program we
independently collected 2 fingerprints for comparison.
Table A.1 summarises the total 20 fingerprints we collected for the
experiment. The source code for the device is published in [174].
Fingerprint Matching
During the experiments we realised that most of the fingerprints do not
adhere to common distributions; therefore we used a non parametric test,
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Distance[175], as our test statistic. This is a
well understood statistic with previous uses in side channel analysis[176].
Table B.1 summarises the relative KS distances computed on each pair of
fingerprints in our experiments.
Even though fingerprints collected on the same application were rejected
by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test, we noticed that their KS distance still
tends to be smaller comparing to fingerprints collected on different programs,
as the bold cells marked in Table B.1.
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By adapting our distinguisher to utilise the minimum KS distance, we
were able to identify 13 out of 20 fingerprints successfully. The ‘overlapping’
fingerprints are mainly due to the “Sensorpayload” program, which access
different sensors, but otherwise has identical program code. Thus we did
expect that the different instantiations of it would lead to very similar
fingerprints.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we explored the use of packet lengths and response times,
which are protocol level side channels, as means to recover information about
IoT ‘things’. We do this experimentally, which we base on two extremely
popular devices running on a popular open source OS, with a typical stack
of protocols. Our results show that it is possible (in principle) to recover
information about a device and its function (i.e. the hardware and the
software that runs on it) via inspecting encrypted traffic that it produces.
We also point out that ICMP messages can be distinguished from each other
despite the use of encryption.
In order to mitigate the leakage that is given by packet lengths, previous
works [48] recommend the usage of different padding schemes such as pad
to fixed length, threshold padding and padding to MTU, etc. We echo this
recommendation. Whilst padding to MTU is considered inefficient for the
Internet, it is in fact highly appropriate for 6LoWPAN because:
• It completely hides the length of original plaintext.
• 6LoWPAN has only a low MTU of 127 bytes; therefore the overhead is
acceptable.
• It induces negligible computational overhead.
With regard to the leaking information about the device or OS, we suggest
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strictly applying the standard MTU to eliminate the differences in drivers.
Although there is a potential of performance downgrade, it will also improve
the compatibility among different devices.
In order to mitigate the leakage given by response times, the natural coun-
termeasure is to write time-constant code, which is known to be notoriously
difficult. But two approaches are available to a software developer:
• Randomly delay the response. This essentially adds noise to the
measurements of the adversary.
• Use a threshold response time, i.e. a request is either responded at a
predefined time or not responded at all.
Within the context of 6LoWPAN the second method is recommended as
most 6LoWPAN applications would tolerate missing packets and timers are
available on most platforms. However, the threshold must be carefully chosen




This thesis set out to examine security issues in IoT applications from various
aspects related to side channel attacks. Three vulnerabilities have been
identified and each of them could pose a great threat to the security of IoT
applications.
The case study in Chapter 3 revealed a flawed design of RNG in a
popular device used by many IoT projects. Our result could be significant
to any secure IoT application built on that device as any cryptographic
implementation cannot be be secure when the underlining RNG is predictable
to the adversary. The importance and necessity of a properly designed RNG
should be reflected on in any secure IoT design in the future.
The threat of DPA in IoT applications was the second focus in this thesis.
This part of the work begins in Chapter 4 with an inspection towards the
“inherent” side channel resilience of ARX ciphers. Whilst part of our results
confirmed that the perceived vulnerable instruction, modular addition, is
hard to attack by conventional DPA techniques, the perceived secure opera-
tions could still be vulnerable when implemented inappropriately. Although
a chosen message DPA strategy dedicated to modular addition was also
proposed, the result was negative on real devices partly due to mismatched
prediction of leakage models.
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Chapter 5 studied generic distinguishers which are specifically useful
against devices with unknown leakage models in DPA attacks. A novel
methodology of constructing generic distinguishers was proposed in our work
and one of our new distinguishers has demonstrated superior performance
in several experiments. The results in Chapter 4 were also extended by
this study, as generic distinguishers were found effective against modular
addition.
The last part of the thesis moved on to side channel attacks at a higher
level in IoT applications in Chapter 6. This research explored the potential
of traffic analysis attacks being ported to the IoT scenarios. The outcome
was concerning, as these attacks proved to be only more effective in these
settings.
Indeed, building a secure IoT application is difficult, not only because of
the nature of constrained resources, but also the fact that not much designers
would have the awareness of all the security threats at different levels. Sadly,
probably inherited from the “no-cross-layer-cooperation” tradition of Internet,
many people working in related fields are reluctant to revisit the problems
from others’ perspectives.
For instance, it is not hard to imagine the cause of the bad RNG design
in Chapter 3: the designers very likely made the choice of reusing existing
components over a dedicated RNG simply for a lower cost, regardless of the
damage it could cause and the fact that the product is advertised for security
purposes. A similar situation can be seen for the protocols we inspected in
Chapter 6 where designers working in the communication aspect tends to
prohibit any attempt that may cause an overhead, including some of the
effective countermeasures against traffic analysis. After all, many security
loopholes could easily be fixed at earlier stages if they got noticed by people
from the relevant areas of expertise.
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7.1 Future Work
Various aspects of the side channel security in IoT have been studied in this
thesis and each of thesis subject could be further extended.
The case study of RNG in Chapter 3 was purely based on black box
experiments. Since the same design was also adopted by other products in
the series, a thorough study of how the circuits are designed would give a
better understanding to the addressed problem. We also noticed that the
later models in that series (e.g. CC2650) have provided a dedicated RNG
which might also worth to be thoroughly studied.
For the popularity of ARX gained in recent years, we hope our results in
Chapter 4 would provide the cryptographic community a better understand-
ing to the side channel related properties of ARX ciphers when proposing
new designs. It is also an interesting research topic to see whether these
results can contribute in designing side channel countermeasures for ARX in
practice.
The Ordinal distinguishers may have the most open questions among this
thesis. For example, could there be a better statistical method to detect the
distinctive repetitive structure than our straightforward approaches? How
should we address the issue of non-uniformly distribute intermediates as in
the case of XOR-then-Multiply? Extending Ordinal distinguishers to multi
dimension also seems to be an interesting open problem.
The leakages described in Chapter 6 mostly utilised a proof-of-concept
set up with the ICMPv6 protocol which does not have any immediate threat
to the upper layer applications. Naturally a next question is then what are
the issues if the same attacks are carried on to upper layer applications where
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[52] Zhe Liu, Thomas Pöppelmann, Tobias Oder et al. ‘High-Performance
Ideal Lattice-Based Cryptography on 8-Bit AVR Microcontrollers’. In:
ACM Trans. Embedded Comput. Syst. 16.4 (2017), 117:1–117:24. doi:
10.1145/3092951. url: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3092951.
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[66] Daniel Dinu, Léo Perrin, Aleksei Udovenko et al. ‘Design Strategies
for ARX with Provable Bounds: Sparx and LAX’. In: Advances in
Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2016 - 22nd International Conference on
the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security,
Hanoi, Vietnam, December 4-8, 2016, Proceedings, Part I. Ed. by
Jung Hee Cheon and Tsuyoshi Takagi. Vol. 10031. Lecture Notes in
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the ring! Practical, Quantum-Secure Key Exchange from LWE’. In:
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2016 (2016), p. 659. url: http:
//eprint.iacr.org/2016/659.
[84] url: https : / / rdist . root . org / 2010 / 01 / 11 / smart - meter -
crypto-flaw-worse-than-thought/.
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[130] Sonia Beläıd, Jean-Sébastien Coron, Pierre-Alain Fouque et al. ‘Im-
proved Side-Channel Analysis of Finite-Field Multiplication’. In: Cryp-
tographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2015 - 17th In-
ternational Workshop, Saint-Malo, France, September 13-16, 2015,
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APPENDIX A. FINGERPRINT EXPERIMENT PROGRAMS
Index Program Total Size Fingerprint Size Note
1 broadcast 6489 593
2 broadcast 6164 639
3 powertrace 7142 539
4 powertrace 7079 561
5 Sensorpayload 7338 987 Temperature + ALS
6 Sensorpayload 7963 934 Temperature + ALS
7 Sensorpayload 7143 1195 Temperature only
8 Sensorpayload 7316 1096 Temperature only
9 Sensorpayload 7895 827 ALS only
10 Sensorpayload 7867 789 ALS only
11 Sensorpayload 7428 1138 No reading
12 Sensorpayload 7462 833 No reading
13 Sensorpayload 6565 1391 Vdd only
14 Sensorpayload 7193 1111 Vdd only
15 Sensorpayload 7672 955 Temperature, Vdd and ALS
16 Sensorpayload 7790 1023 Temperature, Vdd and ALS
17 Sensorpayload 7864 931 Vdd + ALS
18 Sensorpayload 7936 987 Vdd + ALS
19 Sensorpayload 7217 1222 Temperature + Vdd
20 Sensorpayload 7050 1228 Temperature + Vdd
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